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ABSTRACT 
Crafting Alliances Between A Mexican Agribusiness And The Base Of The Pyramid:  
An Action Research Into Strategizing 
By 
Sergio Quinones-Romandia 
May 2016 
Committee Chair: Lars Mathiassen 
Major Academic Unit:  J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
More than 4 billion people in the world face hunger every day. In addition to this 
imperative shortcoming, the world’s poor confront other side effects of poverty as well, 
including violence, forced mobility, lack of access to education and early death. In a 
globalized world where capitalism has become the prevailing economic ideology, 
alleviating poverty can no longer be the exclusive responsibility of governments, richer 
nations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Today, the private sector must 
also “take the torch” and contribute to easing the suffering of more than half the world’s 
population.  
The Base of the Pyramid (BOP) strategy is an important opportunity for the 
world’s private sector to create new business opportunities while at the same time helping 
address and alleviate poverty. However, while the literature describes several study cases, 
we still have limited knowledge about the process through which managers engage in 
BOP strategizing. Against this backdrop, this dissertation provides a detailed account of 
how a Mexican agribusiness: Agroservicios Nacionales, SAPI de CV (ANSA) developed 
and implemented a BOP strategy to co-create value with its distributors and poor corn 
farmers. 
Our Georgia State University (GSU) research team combined Dynamic Capability 
 xiii 
Theory (DCT) and Option-Driven Strategizing (ODS) and adopted action research to 
establish close collaboration among the firm’s top directors, a select group of its 
managers, designated local distributors, and our researcher team members. This 
dissertation presents a detailed account of the strategizing process, how AgroEstacion 
was conceived, how it was implemented, and the outcomes and experiences of the overall 
process. I also discuss the challenges our team faced, how they were resolved, and the 
opportunities that emerged from the strategizing process. Finally, I describe an Integrated 
Model that firms can use to strategize BOP opportunities in a way that benefits both their 
business and the surrounding society. 
This dissertation also represents the challenges of utilizing DCT in a practical 
case, following the suggestions of several authors as Teece, Pisano, Shuen, Zollo, 
Winters and others, from major works of writing that encourage researchers to take this 
theory into a more aggregate system and apply it in a practical case. 
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I CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a farmer in a remote area of a developing Latin American 
economy. Or, to put it in a less politically correct way, imagine you are a farmer in a 
third-world country. Although the wider world might call your home country an 
emerging economy or some other euphemism, the reality is that you live in an 
impoverished area. Getting to the nearest urban area takes you almost four hours, despite 
being only 55 miles away; communications infrastructure is absent; and the roads you 
travel on are rough. If night falls, you must stay put and wait for daylight, because it is 
not safe to travel in the dark. You live in the hills— or La Sierra, as they have been 
called since you were a kid. Your grandfather was a farmer, and so was your father. You 
attended the rural elementary school, but dropped out because men need to work in the 
fields; “you are a man,” they told you, when you were only 10 years old. So, you learned 
what your father learned from your grandfather, who died when he was just 50 years old. 
You have no other options other than running away to the city, where you would try to 
carve out some kind of life; or taking the long journey North—to the United States of 
America—risking your life, crossing the desert, and then (if you make it) doing the same 
job there that you would have done in your home country, but in service of American 
farmers. Instead, you decided to stay and have some faith in the future. You married a 
good woman and had some children and kept farming the land you inherited from your 
father.  
Now, imagine that you are quite different from your father and grandfather. 
Despite your lack of formal education, you have ambitions and want to be and have more 
than they did. You want to give your family a better life. You want your children to have 
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a formal education and better healthcare. You want to own some property and other 
material assets. You want your family to be fed every day and to have better 
opportunities. You want these things, but you do not know how to get them. You have 
heard that help is available—financial support, funds from the government, money for 
farmers like you who own small plots of land—but you do not understand how to access 
that help. The politicians that appear in your small town every sixth year promise you and 
your neighbors that you will receive support once they win the election, but the funding, 
if you are lucky to receive it, is not enough. In short, you are trapped at the Base of the 
Pyramid (BOP). 
BOP strategizing emerged as a business trend over the past decade, rooted in the 
2004 publication of C.K. Prahalad’s The Fortune at the Bottom Of the Pyramid, 
Eradicating Poverty through Profits. Literature about the BOP, BOP markets, and BOP 
poverty alleviation increases yearly in high-profile scientific and practitioner journals; 
articles include “Entrepreneurial Opportunities and Poverty Alleviation,” (Alvarez & 
Barney, 2014); “Building Partnerships to Create Social and Economic Value at the Base 
of the Global Development Pyramid,” (Calton, Werhane, Hartman, & Bevan, 2013); 
“The Mirage of Marketing to the Bottom of the Pyramid: The Perspectives of 
Multinational Corporations,” (Karnani, 2007); and “Business Strategy at the Base of the 
Pyramid,” (Schrader, Freimann, & Seuring, 2012). However, we have developed little 
knowledge about how individual firms might actually strategize BOP opportunities and 
successfully act on them; we also have scant understanding about the process and 
strategies that practitioners follow to co-create value with the BOP segment. Being able 
to study successful use cases can help us assess the BOP proposition’s value and potential 
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impact, as well as create the requisite motivation and background for more closely 
examining the process of strategizing BOP opportunities. That is, such cases can 
document tangible ways in which firms were able to help people trapped at the BOP. 
The focus of this dissertation is to address this void, not based on charity thinking 
or a philanthropic mindset. Instead, it is anchored in what Prahalad articulated as 
“making profit, making profitable the unprofitable” (Prahalad, 2010) —just as our farmer 
imagined in the  Introduction—or, as Bill Gates put it in his speech at the 2008 World 
Economic Forum—anchored in creative capitalism (Gates, 2008). The dissertation will 
investigate the dynamic capabilities (Constance E. Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003; 
Tashman & Marano, 2009; David Teece & Pisano, 1994) of a group of primary 
stakeholders in Mexico’s corn production process: ANSA, its distributors, and BOP corn 
farmers. The collaboration between the GSU research team and the stakeholders 
progressed in two stages. It started in April 2014 based on action research (Susman & 
Evered, 1978), a particular form of engaged scholarship (Van de Ven, 2007) that let us 
both contribute to practical problem solving with the stakeholders and develop new 
knowledge about BOP strategizing. This dissertation builds on early results published in 
(Cazares, Lawson-Lartego, Romandia, & Mathiassen, 2015) and reports on the overall 
action research effort to offer a comprehensive account of how ANSA eventually 
strategized and implemented a new franchise business, AgroEstacion, tailored to the 
industry and the Mexican context. The goal was to co-create value among three main 
players: 
• ANSA and AgroEstacion, 
• the network of local distributors, and  
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• the BOP corn farmers.  
Early in our research collaboration, we uncovered the key resources across the 
stakeholder network, which let us identify a set of available options for value co-creation 
among the main players. Option-Driven Strategizing (ODS) (Bowman & Moskowitz, 
2001; De Schryver & Asselbergh, 2003; Faulkner, 1996; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994) 
helped us classify which of those options could be made actionable and eventually 
realized (Constance E. Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003; Sandberg, Mathiassen, & 
Napier, 2014). Our early findings allowed us to propose a conceptual model for 
strategizing BOP value co-creation. The Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing 
combines Dynamic Capability Theory (DCT) with ODS, focusing on the two main 
players in this project: the firm, with its physical, knowledge, and organizational 
resources; and the BOP network, with its complementary set of physical, knowledge, and 
organizational resources (Cazares et al., 2015).  
The goal of this dissertation project is to continue the practical work of 
implementing AgroEstacion—a joint effort between ANSA and local distributors that 
targets BOP corn farmers. In this process, the research team will apply, validate, and 
further develop the proposed conceptual model. Through this action research with ANSA 
and the other stakeholders, our research project will make three contributions. First, we 
will make a practical contribution to ANSA, the distributors, and the BOP farmers by 
implementing new collaboration patterns, both helping the BOP participants and 
strengthening ANSA’s competitive position. Second, we will contribute new empirical 
evidence to the BOP literature by offering a detailed account of how ANSA and other 
stakeholders strategized and realized BOP opportunities in the Mexican corn industry. 
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Third, we will validate and further develop the Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing, 
making a theoretical contribution to the BOP literature.  
Our research project focuses on crafting alliances within the Mexican BOP 
context, in which farmers and small local firms struggle daily to survive. ANSA provides 
requisite and specific resources for BOP farmers, while the firm’s distributors provide 
local knowledge and new opportunities. However, fully realizing the potential of these 
relationships is possible only if new, powerful alliances are formed. The goal is a win for 
all stakeholders: BOP farmers (like our protagonist at the beginning of the introduction) 
get the opportunity to grow more and better corn; local distributors (BOP local 
businesses) get better commercial opportunities and support; and ANSA strengthens its 
market position. Such wins cannot be achieved through a rigid, uniform approach; 
solutions must be crafted to fit the context. The concept of crafting entails artful—and 
often manual—creation. When an artisan creates a series of pieces, those pieces might be 
similar, but they are never the same. Artisans adapt their work to the context and to their 
emotions. Applying this crafting concept in the BOP market means that firms must 
adapt—rather than simply enforce—a preplanned model; to do this, they must be 
ethically and emotionally committed. Hence, this dissertation seeks to leverage ANSA’s 
collaboration to provide knowledge and guidance that other firms can use to improve and 
optimize their own interactions with the BOP context, and to do so in a way that not only 
increases other firms’ market participation and profits, but also builds knowledge and 
social value to improve the lives of not only the BOP population, but all stakeholders in 
the process (Klein, 2008). 
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In summary, this dissertation seeks to address the following research question: 
How can an agribusiness company strategize and implement co-creation of value with 
BOP corn farmers in Mexico? Following (Mathiassen, 2014), Table 1 summarizes the 
proposed research design. The rest of this proposal describes each of these research 
components and their motivations in more detail. 
Table 1 Research Design 
Style element Description 
P: problem setting 
ANSA, a Mexican agribusiness, wants to design and create a new business 
model for penetrating additional markets in the BOP corn farmers’ 
segment. This effort, shared with select BOP distributors, explores, 
exploits, and seeks to improve the capabilities of ANSA and the BOP 
distributors. It also seeks to improve ANSA’s market position and co-
create value with the BOP distributors and farmers 
A: area of concern Co-creating value with the BOP farmers 
F: theoretical framing Integrated Model of BOP strategizing, Dynamic Capability Theory, and Option-Driven Strategizing 
M: research method 
Action Research developed by a team consisting of an EDB student (the 
author) who holds a director position at ANSA; the firm’s executive team; 
and the dissertation advisor. The research draws on archival and 
bibliographic data to inform collaborative workshops. The research had 
three primary goals: 1) Design the new company (AgroEstacion) and 
launch its operations.. 2) Develop a detailed franchise business model with 
the selected distributors. 3) Create new knowledge about strategizing BOP 
value co-creation 
RQ: research question How can an agribusiness company strategize and implement the co-creation of value with BOP corn farmers in Mexico? 
C: contribution 
• Contribution to the problem: A strategy for implementing a franchise 
company to share the capabilities of local BOP distributors, who in turn 
could become business leaders in their area and channel additional 
resources to BOP farmers, reducing their problems in areas such as 
technology and uncertainly about crop sales 
• Contribution to area of concern: Empirical insights into a process for 
strategizing BOP markets in a particular firm 
• Contribution to the theoretical framing: A conceptual model for 
strategizing BOP markets, with suggested principles to guide managers 
in adopting and using the model in similar contexts 
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II CHAPTER 2: PROBLEM SETTING 
There are no problems, only opportunities. 
 —Bill Austin 
II.1 The Firm’s Challenges 
ANSA is a young, medium-sized Mexican firm with more than 200 employees. 
Its primarily activity is distributing the main brands of the agrochemical industry’s 
biggest Multinational Companies (MNCs), including Dow Chemical, Food Machinery 
Company (FMC), Monsanto, Bayer, Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik (BASF), and 
ARYSTA. These MNCs have been working shoulder-to-shoulder with ANSA, and have 
co-existed with relative ease within the firm’s business model, despite developing and 
promoting competing products that address similar crop diseases. When asked how 
ANSA has managed to interact with such heavyweight stakeholders, the ANSA board’s 
founder and president said jokingly: “Do you know how porcupines make love? Very 
carefully.”  ANSA is, however, more than a product distributor; it represents the brands 
and defends, promotes, and develops them through a commercial–technical team of 
agronomists. These agronomists have a dual function: they are both field technicians and 
salespeople. ANSA’s business model has adapted to many rapid changes in the market 
and the industry over the past 38 years; the company has been consistent, but never static. 
ANSA was founded in November 1977 by Sergio Quinonez Rey, a young 
agronomist who had been recently fired from Roman-Hass, an MNC that is now 
ironically owned by Dow Chemical—one of ANSA’s main suppliers. After leaving 
Roman-Hass, Quinonez Rey and his family moved from Mexico City to Guadalajara, 
Mexico’s second largest city, located in Jalisco State in the western part of the country. 
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During the ’70s, most of Mexico’s advanced agriculture was located in the northern states 
(Sonora, Sinaloa, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas), and most of the MNCs and the new 
Mexican distribution firms competed aggressively to win a piece of that market. Farming 
in western Mexico held little interest for the MNCs at that time; the market was 
fragmented and the farmers needed constant advice. ANSA’s initial operation was a 
simple “buy and sell over the counter” process: farmers arrived at the original petite store 
located across from a well-known food market to buy seeds and fertilizers. In 1978, 
ANSA added agrichemicals to its product line and began to compete in the governmental 
market through an intermediary: BANRURAL (National Agrarian Credit Bank), the 
original financial institution created in 1926 to aid Mexican farmers. This private–public 
commercial operation accelerated the company’s growth and, for half a decade, became 
ANSA’s main line of business. The founder recalled those years as challenging ones: 
“We grew, and finally money started to get into our pockets, but selling to the 
government wasn’t easy. You need to ‘oil the machinery,’ taking bureaucrats to long, 
festive meals that endured sometimes until dawn… but the deal could not be made in any 
other way.”  
ANSA’s history can be described in four phases; those phases defined its business 
model and made the company what it is today. Table 2 summarizes those historical 
phases. By the end of the ’80s, BANRURAL, ANSA’s main customer, went bankrupt. 
ANSA thus faced its first important challenge, and executives were forced to reconsider 
the firm’s business model. As the company founder put it, “We had to rethink the whole 
way of doing business, from big sales to a unique client [BANRURAL] to small-scale 
sales through stores. We learned that we shouldn’t depend on one main customer. 
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Although it could be comfortable, it was extremely risky.” ANSA’s executives thus 
decided to open two business units closer to the farming areas. This meant that farmers 
no longer had to travel to Guadalajara city to sell their crops, and corn buyers could settle 
in the rural areas and built silos there. During that time, other agrochemical distribution 
companies began taking pesticides and fertilizers directly to the farmers and a few small, 
competing agrochemical stores opened in the rural areas. 
Table 2 ANSA's four phase history 
Phase Description 
Phase 1: 1977–1980 BANRURAL era 
Phase 2: 1980–1990 Multinational corporations enter the market and the distribution chain begins 
Phase 3: 1990–2010 New foreign companies and cheaper products enter the market 
Phase 4: 2010–
present 
Multinational corporation pressures to increase the 
purchase of inventory 
 
Based on ANSA’s previous sales to the Mexican government, two MNCs (FMC 
and DOW Chemical) entrusted ANSA with some of their leading products—including 
FMC’s  insecticide for soil application, and DOW’s corn-selective herbicide. This event 
triggered Phase 2 in ANSA’s history. The MNCs’ confidence in ANSA gave it a 
competitive advantage against the market’s already established players, who later 
disappeared from the industry. The founder recalled this key transition: “To be honest, at 
that time, the big distributors had become too self-confident and were not interested in 
some of the products the MNCs were trying to push into the market. We raised our hands 
and said: ‘Give them to us, and we’ll sell them.’” 
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During the ’90s, ANSA build a commercial team and began developing a network 
of distributors at locally owned agro-shops in small towns and villages. In addition, other 
MNCs approached ANSA—including BASF and Monsanto, and smaller MNCs, such as 
Buckman and Arysta—trusting the young firm with their leading brands. The business 
grew, but not without competition. Still, ANSA focused on its business process, its 
suppliers, and its network of distributors, and this mindset strengthened its competitive 
position.  
A major change in ANSA’s context emerged in the first decade of the 21st 
century. As Figure 1 shows, since the ’80s, ANSA’s business process had been a 
supplier-firm→local distributor→farmer model in which stakeholders depended on each 
other. In this model, ANSA played what (Sheth, 2011) classifies as “The Native Son” 
role as a large-scale domestic enterprise. However, as many MNC products lost their 
patents, new companies from China and India began manufacturing them at lower costs 
and introducing them into the Mexican market, dramatically changing the existing model. 
 
Figure 1 ANSA's business process 
These new international companies changed the model, skipping the distribution 
chain and going directly to local distributors. This strategy was motivated by the fact that 
the big distributors (such as ANSA) already worked with the traditional MNCs. As a 
result of this new model, similar—and cheaper—products flowed into the market. At the 
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start of this phase, ANSA persuaded many local distributors and farmers of the risks 
involved in using low-quality products. However, this phase changed ANSA’s distributor 
network; while some distributors remained loyal to the firm, others became competitors.  
More recently, ANSA began experiencing additional pressures: the firm’s allies—
the MNCs that ANSA had remained loyal to—began doing business directly with some 
of the successful local distributors. ANSA’s executives, managers, and sale 
representatives could not understand how easily some of its strategic suppliers, without 
negotiating or even notifying the company, simply went down a rung on the business 
ladder and transformed ANSA’s biggest local distributors into their own new partners. 
When questioned, one of the MNCs’ executives explained that the local distributors had 
two key characteristics that ANSA lacked:  
1. Direct contact with and data about local corn farmers.  
2. Knowledge about the commercialization of corn. These local distributors provide 
farmers with seed, fertilizers, and agrichemicals (and, in some cases, money). 
Then, at the end of the harvest, the distributors receive the corn and sell it to big 
firms, paying the differences in the price to the farmer (Figure 2). 
However, ANSA’s new situation was a painful and indisputable truth. Some 
executives admitted to a gap that had weakened the long-enjoyed loyalty between ANSA 
and its distributor network. This gap was ignorance about the details of the distributors’ 
operations and processes. As a top executive from one of ANSA’s major suppliers put it: 
“ANSA’s business model has expired. The firm needs to make some changes or face a 
slow death.” ANSA’s competitive position and, indeed, its long-term survival were at 
risk. If ANSA kept doing the same things and following the same path, its industry 
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relevance would diminish and the firm would slowly die. Although its business process 
was solid and required only a few adjustments and innovations, ANSA’s survival 
depended on its developing new strategies to fill the gap pointed out by suppliers and 
industry experts.  
 
Figure 2 The business process of local distributors 
II.2 The Firm Opportunities 
ANSA owns important physical, knowledge, and organizational resources. Over 
nearly 40 years, ANSA has created a network of warehouses strategically located in the 
main agricultural areas, which reduces the delivery time between local distributor stores 
and big farming companies. Some of these warehouses are business units equipped with 
human, logistic, and IT resources. Agronomists (sale representatives) are on site, 
supported by administrative professionals that help with transactional details. These 
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warehouses also have important logistic resources. Each agronomist—from the regional 
manager to the part-time promoter—has a truck, which serves as a small-scale (one-ton 
capacity) delivery unit. ANSA also has a fleet of medium- and large-capacity trucks to 
keep inventory near local distributors and farmers. Regarding knowledge resources, 
ANSA has an experienced commercial team with specialties on specific crops (including 
corn and avocado). Suppliers and the firm have coaching programs to continually train 
their commercial team of specialists. One of an agronomist’s main responsibilities is to 
serve as an advisor to farmers and local distributors. In a way, ANSA’s sales force 
consists of technological advisors responsible for pushing products to the market. 
ANSA thus faced its challenges armed with years of accumulated market 
knowledge about climate, crops, soil, and pests. As Figure 3 shows, this knowledge is 
contained in a network of more than 1,800 distributors in 22 business units scattered 
strategically throughout Mexico’s western, central, and southern states. 
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Figure 3 Geographical coverage of ANSA in Mexico 
ANSA’s resources are key strengths in its market position and highly regarded by 
both suppliers and banks because they provide certainty about ANSA’s access to and 
control over key farming areas. ANSA’s 220 employees are constantly supplying data 
about their specific market areas to the main office. As a result, ANSA has key market 
details that can consolidate and improve the firm’s performance. Table 3 summarizes 
ANSA’s key resources.  
Although ANSA’s executives are aware that the firm’s success lies in its 
resources, they also realize that ANSA needs to better exploit and further those resources. 
Currently, ANSA has major opportunities in five key areas: 
• ANSA has yet to establish direct contact with small- and medium-sized corn 
farmers 
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• Local distributors interact directly with small- and medium-sized corn farmers 
• Some small local distributors are very committed to ANSA and want to follow the 
firm’s lead 
• An enormous BOP corn farmers’ market—6.4 million hectares (Damián-Huato et 
al., 2013)—exists in ANSA’s territory 
• ANSA competitors are not strategizing the BOP market 
Table 3ANSA's key resources 
Resource Type ANSA Network 
Physical Resources 
• Warehouses 
• Logistics and delivery equipment 
• Real-time IT system 
Knowledge Resources 
• Professional and experienced sales force 
• 38 years of market knowledge 
• Deep knowledge of Mexico’s agriculture industry 
• Chain of more than 1,350 local distributors 
Organizational Resources 
• Speed in responding to customer demands 
• Customers’ data history 
• Access to potential customers’ credit and legal records 
• Credit and financial assets 
• Network of suppliers and harvest buyers 
 
II.3 Mexican BOP Corn Farmers 
Your godmother Trinidad died,  
My children grew and where are they now? 
I lost the harvest, and burned the hut, 
Without what I love most, nothing matters no more… 
—Pancho Madrigal, “Jacinto Cenobio,” 1988 
This verse is from a rural song about a young man who arrives in “La Capital” 
(Mexico City) looking for his godfather, a poor and old farmer. The young man finds his 
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godfather in a farmer’s market, working as a back-loader—a low-paying job typically 
done by the poorest people in Mexico. The young man tells his godfather that he was sent 
to bring him back to the village. The old man tell his godson that there is nothing left for 
him back home, because he had lost his wife, his sons, and his crop. The song is a 
reflection of the BOP farmer’s life in rural Mexico: full of uncertainty and devoid of 
hope. The story also illustrates the reality of almost 4 million Mexicans—a reality filled 
with uncertainty, fear, hunger, and forced mobility. Corn is the most common crop in 
Mexico. Some corn farmers, of course, own large plots of land, but the great majority live 
in the BOP segment. These are the poorest farmers, uneducated and financially unstable. 
In Mexico, 52.3 percent of the population, or more than 62 million people, live below the 
poverty line and depend primarily on subsistence agriculture. Farming is a challenging 
activity anywhere, and Mexico’s countryside is no exception. As consumers, we tend to 
forget where our food comes from, taking for granted a guaranteed food supply. Still, 
each year, more people like the old man in the song desert farms and fields and move to 
the cities, or north, to the US, to escape a grim reality. 
Many of Mexico’s 4 million farmers depend on seasonal corn, or maize, 
production (INEGI census 2012); in 2010, the estimated corn cultivation in Mexico was 
7.86 million ha, or 36 percent of the total arable land. Of that amount, 82 percent was 
planted under rain-fed conditions, and the total production volume was 24.4 million tons 
(Damián-Huato et al., 2013). Financial support for corn farming is scarce; although corn 
farmers have access to some government support, the end of the production process is 
always the same: they face uncertainty about selling their crop, and, in many cases, about 
receiving payment if they do. The fates of most BOP corn farmers are in the hands of 
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middlemen, or coyotes—that is, people who receive the grain after harvest and sell it to 
big buyers, such as food, oil, or meat producers. Not all middlemen are exploitive, but 
exploitation is, unfortunately, a common phenomenon. One of the local distributors we 
interviewed was a dynamic woman who owns a small agro-shop and coordinates 
approximately 350 BOP corn farmers. She characterized a typical run-in with exploitive 
middlemen as follows: “They told them (the farmers), ‘Well, I’m sorry, but the big buyer 
hasn’t paid me yet, so you’ll need to wait a little longer.’ But in many cases, that’s not 
true, that is just a lie, because the coyotes have received the payment for the corn 
already, but they wasted the money on other things. They don’t care if the farmer needs 
urgently his money—they just don’t care.” 
ANSA depends on its local distributors network to access the corn farmers, who 
are scattered in the sierras and valleys. Some local distributors who were previously 
ANSA’s allies have become its competitors, and have begun to engage in corn 
commercial processes. These enablers developed “crop contracts” with farmers, 
providing them with key materials: seeds, fertilizers, and agrichemicals, in that order. 
Some enablers, the fair ones, also organize and guide the farmers in applying for and 
receiving government funds each year, which requires doing paperwork (most BOP 
farmers do not know how to apply for the money, and some are illiterate), these 
middlemen or enabler firms collect the corn and set the price; the fair ones respect the 
Chicago Market price, the unfair ones do not. Given this unfair treatment and an absence 
of other financial resources, corn farmers are rarely able to invest in improving their 
production performance and thus their standard of living (Calton et al., 2013; Perez-
Aleman & Sandilands, 2008). The average US corn farm produces approximately 7.8 to 
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14 tons of corn per hectare (ton/ha). In Mexico, BOP corn farmers plant and grow their 
crops during the rainy season, between May and September, and each year they face 
uncertainty over this natural water supply. Many have an average production of just 3 
ton/ha, due to the lack of adequate agrichemicals, fertilizers and/or low performance 
seeds. With the right seed, fertilizer, and agrichemical technology, they could become 
more productive and thereby improve their quality of life. 
 In relation to the BOP in Mexico, several important facts require urgent attention: 
• 53 million Mexicans live in what is considered extreme poverty (INEGI and 
CONEVAL) 
• An additional 41 million people are at risk of falling into poverty because they 
lack appropriate income, education, housing, health, or social security 
• According to INEGI, 22.2 percent of Mexico’s BOP population (more than 26 
million people) lives in rural areas 
• The percentage of BOP people living in rural areas has been decreasing over the 
past 20 years, from 28.7 percent in 1990 to 22.2 percent in 2010, due to the 
internal and external migration triggered by poverty 
In Mexico, corn farming is the rural BOP population’s primary activity, for either 
cultural or practical reasons. Corn in general represents 18 percent of the production 
value of Mexico’s agriculture; in 2012, that translated to 88 billion pesos (6.68 billion 
dollars). Corn represents 33 percent of Mexico’s planted land, or 7.5 million hectares 
(SAI-SAGARPA, 2014 preliminary numbers). The national average in corn production is 
3.2 ton/ha. If corn is planted as a seasonal crop, the production goes down to 2.2 ton/ha, 
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and if it is planted as an irrigation crop, it goes up to 7.5 ton/ha. These figures are 38 
percent below the average global production. For comparison alone, the US national 
average for all corn production is 7.8 ton/ha (World Bank Data). 
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III CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
We never know which lives we influence, or when, or why. 
 —Stephen King 
III.1 The BOP Proposition 
According to the World Bank, in 2014, more than 4 billion people in the world 
were living in the BOP on less than $2.00 per day (see Figure 4). This plight impacts all 
economies and is a responsibility not just of governments, but of the private sector as 
well (C. Prahalad & Hart, 2002). Year by year, governments spend billions of dollars on 
programs to alleviate poverty, but such programs often fail because the BOP population 
is concentrated in countries that often have unstable governments and a culture of 
corruption. Also, such countries typically have inadequate control of the financial 
resources intended to alleviate poverty. Sometimes, the money gets to the people who 
need it, but the money itself doesn’t necessarily solve larger problems such as 
productivity, corruption, and criminality; other times, the money doesn’t reach people 
who need it at all. Given this, the private sector must speed up its participation in efforts 
to alleviate poverty and create not only opportunities for the BOP population, but for 
itself through the development of new business models and new markets. Although 
capitalism has prevailed as the only functional option for the global economy, the way 
firms and governments have developed this capitalism is having what negative impact re: 
BOP etc. Hence, there is an urgent need to adjust this development and create what 
Prahalad called “inclusive capitalism” (C. K. Prahalad, 2009).  
Currently, 60 percent of the global population at the lowest pyramid level is being 
sustained by the remaining 40 percent. However, with the birth rate slowing in the middle 
and upper levels of the economic pyramid and increasing in the BOP, the private sector 
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must become creative, not just to increase its own income, but also to address its moral 
responsibility to society given that the private sector often claims/monopolizes resources 
that might otherwise sustain the poor, relies on its labor to increase profits. Moreover, 
firms and governments must change how they look at the BOP and seek to help its 
members become active stakeholders in the global economy rather than simply passive 
recipients of altruism (C. K. Prahalad, 2009). Another vital factor here is that the BOP 
proposition cannot be an exclusive or particular view—imitable and exportable. Instead, 
it must be crafted according to the characteristics of the specific BOP context. The poor 
are different from region to region, state to state, country to country, and continent to 
continent; firms must therefore adapt their BOP strategies to the target BOP market’s 
context. Four billion people are not a monolith; their experiences are extremely varied (C. 
K. Prahalad, 2009). As a result, the BOP’s potential cannot be realized unless managers 
are willing to experiment and innovate (C. K. Prahalad, 2009). 
 
Figure 4 The economic pyramid 
Aside from the participation of the MNCs, most of the BOP market’s needs are 
satisfied by small businesses, which are often owned by people who themselves came 
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from the BOP. Given this, regardless of how well intended these micro businesses are, 
their prices are sometimes higher than those available to the middle segment of the 
economic pyramid. Other factors also increase the cost of living at the BOP. Most BOP 
markets are located in hard to reach areas, roads are few and difficult to travel on, and 
inventory is often damaged on the way or in storage areas. Further, some markets are 
located in risky weather regions, where extreme humidity and high temperatures can 
affect inventory sustainability. Additional factors include excessive links in the 
distribution chain between the firm and the market, over taxation, and monopoly—all of 
which produce what Prahalad calls “the poverty penalty” (C. K. Prahalad, 2009).  
Prahalad published Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty 
Through Profits in 2006; since that time, numerous research efforts have studied the BOP 
market and actions taken by various MNCs that understood that market’s potential 
(Alvarez & Barney, 2014; Calton et al., 2013; Karnani, 2007; Klein, 2008; Mee-Shew & 
Belden, 2013; Mezias & Fakhreddin, 2014; Penh, 2009; Perez-Aleman & Sandilands, 
2008). The contributions came from both practical and academic perspectives. In some 
cases, firms developed their own particular BOP strategies, providing case studies in 
success and failure that contributed to our knowledge. In others cases, academia took the 
lead, applying theories such as dynamic capabilities in relation to BOP strategies 
(Marano, 2009).  
By 2014, only a few national and international companies had focused their 
strategies on Mexico’s BOP markets. Specifically, the BOP agricultural sector in Mexico 
warrants study. Although MNCs such as Monsanto (Donnet et al., 2012; Glover, 2007) 
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have engaged in the BOP approach, their focus has been on the BOP as consumers rather 
than partners. 
III.2 BOP Examples 
Different motives and goals have driven firms to contribute at the BOP level over 
the past 20 years. A mixture of profit and humanistic motives drove each case, while 
curiosity may have been another trigger, spiced with creativity and ambition. Successful 
cases emerged from around the world, mostly from MNCs that immersed themselves in 
the BOP market, but also from new companies that took risks in a market that few had 
dared to enter before. In the following, we present five examples that highlight what these 
cases can contribute to our knowledge on targeting the BOP. 
CELTEL (communications): Founded in the ’90s by Mo Ibrahim, an ex-college 
professor and a software firm CEO, CELTEL was the first telecommunication company 
to risk incursion into Africa—one of the world’s most underserved telecommunication 
markets. Ibrahim was shocked at that time about the western world’s general ignorance 
about Africa and the immense opportunities the continent held. When he suggested the 
possibility of entering the African market to his software clients, their responses often 
bordered on alarmed; as one put it, “Mo, I thought you were smarter than that! You want 
me to go to my board and say I want to start a business in a country run by this crazy guy 
Idi Amin?” (p. 41). Africa has 50 countries, 1 billion people, and 11.7 million square 
miles of land. As an example of the continent’s potential, in 1998, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo had 55 million people and only 3,000 telephone lines. CELTEL 
launched operations in Africa in 1998 with only five employees. The continent had no 
fixed telephone lines and no mobile phone competitors at that time; investors had 
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considered Africa too unknown and too risky. CELTEL started with $16 million in 
capital the first year. By 2004, it had 5.2 million managed customers in 13 countries and 
revenues of $614 million, with a net profit of $147 million. In 2004, pressure brought on 
by capital needs and rejections from financial institutions led Ibrahim to sell CELTEL to 
ZAIN, a Kuwaiti-based mobile telecommunications company—for $3.4 billion dollars. 
CELTEL changed the concept of the mobile phone market. In the ’90s, most 
telecommunication firms focused on making the product more affordable for the middle-
class, without thinking about the BOP market. CELTEL dabbled in prepaid cards and 
transformed many small village traders into business people. The benefit created for the 
BOP in Africa was enormous. CELTEL employees received training and over-the-market 
salaries that motivated them to stay in their home countries rather than migrate to Europe. 
CELTEL also helped the BOP by reducing the cost for communication and travel for 
farmers and small entrepreneurs; reuniting families pushed apart by local wars; and 
giving jobs and education to people who could not otherwise access them (Ibrahim, 2012; 
Klein, 2008). 
Honey CARE Africa: Prior to the year 2000, honey producers in Kenya were 
poor rural farmers working at the mercy of middlemen or intermediaries. At that time, the 
honey industry was at subsistence levels; farmers were paid late at unfair prices, and the 
market was corrupt and inefficient. For farmers in the honey business, margins were 
nonexistent.  
When the international NGO CARE entered the market in 2000, honey production 
had long been controlled by men. By 2006, a new company—Farouk Jiwa—helped 
change that context. Today, women do 30 percent of the honey business, which, with the 
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help of CARE partners and other NGOs, has now become profitable. Farouk Jiwa pays 
the farmers market prices in 48-hour terms. CARE made the connections between the 
BOP producer and the markets (national and international) and provided training and 
technology. Honey CARE is now the largest producer of high-quality honey in Eastern 
Africa (Dossani et al., 2007; Klein, 2008). 
Project Shakti, Hindustan Lever: A subsidiary of Unilever, the Shakti Project 
began as a venture to stimulate demand for Unilever products among the BOP. The 
project started in partnership with rural self-help groups, offering micro-credit and 
training to illiterate women, transforming them into entrepreneurs. Shakti women receive 
training in sales and education in personal and oral hygiene; they then become 
spokeswomen for Unilever through door-to-door sales. By 2005, the Shakti project had 
extended to 50,000 villages and had 13,000 Shakti-Entrepreneurs reaching 15 million 
people in rural areas (Klein, 2008). 
Farmacias Similares: Before Farmacias Similares launched in 1994, Mexico’s 
poor had to get their medicines from the government, which often ran out of stock. At the 
time, the government was satisfying only 18 percent of the BOP population’s need for 
medicine, and the only other option was extremely expensive medicines sold in private 
pharmacies. Farmacias Similares was a partial franchise concept that sold generic 
versions of medicines with expired patents. It opened stores in poor areas with prices that 
were at least 30 percent lower than those in other stores. In addition, each pharmacy had a 
medical doctor who offered primary healthcare consultation for only $ 50.00 Mexican 
pesos ($2.00 USD). 
Farmacias Similares’ arrival changed Mexico’s entire drugstore industry. In its 
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wake, other pharmacy businesses began selling generic medicines and lowered their shelf 
prices. In nine years, Farmacias Similares has become the largest drugstore chain in 
Mexico, with 3,400 stores and $600 million USD in sales. The company serves more than 
10 million customers, and is now beginning to serve the middle class as well (Klein, 
2008). 
CEMEX: Francisco Garza, President of CEMEX, the leading cement Mexican 
company, created Patrimonio Hoy (PH) in 1998. Mr. Garza was concerned because 40 
percent of CEMEX cement’s users were construction workers with very low income, and 
CEMEX knew nothing about them. Thus, the company primarily formed PH to 
understand these customers and determine how it could make them a larger part of its 
market. 
Mexican low-income families are very different from those in the US. Because of 
the strong economic crises faced by Mexican people in different generations, the 
“patrimonio”—that is, the house, is one of a family’s more important assets for two 
reasons: it doesn’t lose its value as rapidly as the local currency, the Mexican peso, and 
its owners perceive it as solid and enduring. Low-income families build their homes step 
by step, sometimes on weekends and holidays, and typically as a family activity. These 
houses are mainly constructed on irregular lands, or ex-predios—that is, lands that use to 
be for farming, but became attached to the cities as they expanded. CEMEX realized it 
knew little about these construction workers, but that if it could help them grow their 
patriminios, they could become an important part of CEMEX’s market. When the 
research process was done and the firm understood the specifics about this group, it was 
time to strategize. CEMEX followed the “Tanda” concept of offering a “group savings 
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process,” in which three families contributed as a team, paying $11.50 USD per week per 
family for 10 weeks. Each week, one of the team’s three families was randomly chosen to 
receive the group’s money to build their planned room or house extension. CEMEX 
provided an experienced architect and an engineer to design the room plans for the 
family. PH also developed “Promotoras,” people who were well known and trusted by 
the community who earned a commission for each family or group they brought into the 
Tanda. From the start, 90 percent of the Promotoras have been women. CEMEX 
organizes presentations about the program and the Promotoras bring in candidates. If a 
family gets behind in its Tanda payment, the Promotoras analyze the situation and make 
decisions about how to proceed. CEMEX’s PH program has helped the firm understand 
and develop strategies to help a key user of its product, and in turn is helping grow the 
BOP market’s assets and creating higher profits for the company (Klein, 2008; Rangan, 
Quelch, Herrero, & Barton, 2007; Segel, Chu, & Herrero, 2006).  
Table 4 summarizes the examples of documented BOP cases. These firms’ 
experiences show that “the BOP contains a large number of people with a substantial 
collective purchasing power” (Klein, 2008). These cases also show that, with the right 
strategy, firms were able to change their businesses to serve the BOP and achieve 
positive results. Many additional success cases are presented in diverse academic works, 
including Business Solutions for the Global Poor: Creating Social and Economic Value 
(Rangan et al., 2007). 
The five example cases presented here offer some contribution in terms of 
strategizing the BOP. CELTEL and Unilever’s Project Shakti used education as triggers 
to develop their strategies. CELTEL trained micro entrepreneurs and made them 
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profitable, helping their employees develop the capabilities needed to stay in their 
homeland and avoid the seemingly inevitable migration to Europe. Project Shakti 
educated its saleswomen in health issues, and they in turn became educators in the 
villages they visited and for the families to whom they sold their products. CELTEL 
exploited technology to reduce the cost to its clients, a strategy also used by Honey 
CARE, which used information systems to advise farmers about prices and potential 
buyers. Two firms contributed to strategy in their use of experts on location: Farmacias 
Similares introduced medical doctors in pharmacy stores for walk-in consultations, while 
CEMEX supplied an architect and an engineer to help the BOP customers design and 
build their homes. CEMEX also contributed to strategy by exploiting social networks to 
create and promote its Promotoras, as well as by developing the group savings and Tanda 
programs, which reduce the risk of overdue accounts. 
Table 4 Examples of firms investing in the BOP 
Firm Article Keywords Source 
CELTEL 
“Growing 
Inclusive 
Markets” 
Mobile 
telecommunications, 
Africa 
Catheu, 2007 
Honey CARE 
Africa N/A Farming, middlemen, food 
Branzei & Valente, Richard 
Ivey School of Business, 
2001 
Project Shakti, 
Hindustan Lever 
LTD (Unilever) 
N/A Rural areas, female entrepreneurs, micro-credit 
Ionescu-Somers & Amann, 
IMD International, 2006 
Farmacias  
Similares 
N/A Low-cost medicines, franchises, entrepreneurs 
Chu & Garcia-Cuellar, 
Harvard Business School 
Press, 2007 
CEMEX “Patrimonio Hoy” 
Cement market, micro-
credit, entrepreneurs, 
housing 
Segel, Chu, & Herrero, 
Harvard Business School 
Publishing, 2006 
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III.3 The Assets Hexagon 
Almost half the world’s population lives in rural regions, and most of those 
people live in poverty. Such inequalities in human development are a primary cause of 
social unrest and, in some parts of the world, even violence (A. P. J. Abdul Kalam). 
Poverty is a concept that extends beyond a lack of liquidity or capacity to satisfy 
basic needs, and it often has multiple causes (Penh, 2009; Sen, 1999). Still, narrow 
definitions of poverty also exist, and focus solely on income or purchasing power. It was 
Sen (1974) who brought new depths to our understanding of poverty. For many years, 
scholars, practitioners, and firms understood the concept of poverty through Maslow’s 
pyramid. According to Maslow, people could not consider the pyramid’s upper echelons 
without first satisfying their basic needs for food and water. Although this is essentially 
true, as Sen pointed out in his capabilities framework, individuals require a range of 
capacities in order to make choices that improve their well-being (Penh, 2009; Sen, 
1999). BOP corn farmers in Mexico, for example, lack access to many such capacities, 
including education. This absence of adequate educational institutions limits the 
development of farmers and their families.  
Penh’s Asset Hexagon (Figure 5) shows six assets individuals and their families 
need to develop and progress. Unlike Maslow’s layered pyramid model, the hexagon 
presents a cyclical process of relationships. The absence of any one asset affects the 
strength and performance of the others. The hexagon’s six assets are: human, natural, 
financial, physical, social, and political. It does not prioritize any one asset (as in 
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Maslow’s pyramid). Instead, it shows how interconnected and interdependent the assets 
are for the development of an individual or a family.  
Mexican corn farmers face a serious shortage of several of these assets, which 
shapes their way of life and restricts their capacity for success. The hexagon’s effect is 
circular: the absent of one asset affects the existence, permanence, or viability of the rest. 
Regarding the education asset, for example, rural schools in Mexico have neither the best 
quality of content nor high effectiveness, in part because they lack quality teachers.  
This, in turn, is because the people selected to teach in rural schools are often 
poorly qualified and spend most of the school year striking and participating in work 
stoppages to pressure the government for any claim that the union leaders feel entitled to 
ask, such as wages or budget increase. 
 
Figure 5 Penh's asset hexagon 
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Political groups and unions control and manage the teaching jobs in rural Mexico. 
Labor assets are also absent because of the nonexistent financial assets of credit, cash, 
and wages. Thus, young men and women must leave rural areas to find work, and often 
migrate to the cities or to the US in search of better income. These financial assets are 
lacking because institutions, such as banks, have no interest in facing uncollectible 
accounts due to the institutional voids in Mexico’s commercial laws. Trying to collect 
accounts in the Mexican sierra it is an expensive an almost hopeless task and the 
authorities try to avoid impounding the scarce assets of the poor people due to the 
enormous political cost.  
BOP corn farmers plant their crops based on the rainy season calendar; they do 
not have access to waterholes or spring systems. Thus, each year they face uncertainty 
about the quantity of rain for each cycle—it could be a little or it could be a lot. Most 
BOP corn farmers own small plots of land. These ejidos were distributed to farmers 
during massive land distribution programs that divided up the large Haciendas after the 
Mexican revolution of 1910 (Segel et al., 2006). These farmers cannot afford to own 
mechanical tools and physical assets such as tractors, seeders, sprayers, and harvesters. 
Accessing raw materials—seeds, fertilizers, and agrichemicals—depends on the farmer’s 
credibility with the local distributor, who offers product on credit. Politicians are largely 
absent here; they approach BOP corn farmers only when an election is impending. In 
addition to the lacks from the asset hexagon, the BOP farmers in Mexico face 
institutional voids in their context. Tarun Khannan and Krishna Palepu from Harvard 
University in their 2000 paper presented the Institutional voids framework referred to the 
BOP markets, or as they referred in a more political correct way: the emerging markets. 
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They expressed in their article: “In emerging markets, in contrast (To the United States), 
there are a variety of market failures. For example, financial markets are characterized by 
a lack of adequate disclosure and weak corporate governance and control. Intermediaries 
such as financial analysts, mutual funds, investment bankers, venture capitalists and a 
financial press are either absent or not fully evolved. Securities regulations are generally 
weak, and their enforcement is erratic (p. 2) (Khanna & Palepu, 2000). The institutional 
voids in Mexico are well known by locals, and in particular in the farming context are 
extremely notorious. As mentioned before, financial players are absent in this industry 
and the securities regulation presences is ambiguous. 
Thus, BOP corn farmers experience shortages in five key areas:  
• Human assets: education and labor 
• Natural assets: water resources 
• Financial assets: credit from financial institutions, savings (and the capacity to 
generate them), and wages 
• Physical assets: seeds and tools 
• Political assets: access to political leaders and recourse through a legal system  
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IV CHAPTER 4: FRAMEWORK 
This section presents an analytical framework developed early in this action 
research project. Based on DCT, ODS, and BOP theory, the framework offers a 
perspective on how firms can strategize BOP opportunities in specific markets. This 
dissertation applies the framework to analyze ANSA’s problem-solving cycle, which led 
to the formation of AgroEstacion, which in turn validates the framework. The empirical 
findings are then combined with extant theory to suggest propositions for strategizing 
BOP opportunities. 
IV.1 Dynamic Capabilities Theory 
Here, DCT is used to detail the main resources of the two key stakeholders—
ANSA and the BOP—focusing on physical resources, knowledge resources, and 
organizational resources. For both stakeholders, these resources fed off knowledge and 
data and fed into the strategy, which then helped develop and improve the resources’ 
capabilities (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Sandberg et al., 2014).  
In 1997, three researchers—David J. Teece (Haas School of Business, University 
of California Berkeley), Gary Pisano (Graduate School of Business Administration, 
Harvard University) and Amy Shuen (School of Business, San Jose State University)—
published a paper, “Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Management” (D. Teece, 1997) 
based on a 1994 effort by Teece and Pisano.  In that earlier work, “The Dynamic 
Capabilities of Firms” (David Teece & Pisano, 1994), the authors introduced the dynamic 
capabilities concept and a resource-based view of the firm to confront the question of 
how firms achieve and sustain competitive advantage by building and reconfiguring their 
internal and external firm-specific capabilities into new capabilities that match their 
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turbulent environment. The term “dynamic capabilities” was first introduced by Gary 
Hamel and  C.K. Prahalad in their paper, “Core Competences of the Corporation” (C. 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). The most relevant initial paper in strategizing through DCT is 
that of Hamel and Prahalad as it makes detailed analyses of the theory applied to the 
firms’ core and context. 
Before the 20th century’s final decade, Porter’s “competitive forces” approach 
was the spearhead of business strategizing (Porter, 1979, 2008; David Teece & Pisano, 
1994; David J. Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Of course, other theories dominated in the 
business and organizational fields, but academics and practitioners preferred Porter’s 
approach. Porter focused specifically on the context, the industry, the competition, and 
the ways a firm might gain advantage over its competitors by exploiting factors such as 
cost and weaknesses in others. Porter’s five forces, Game Theory, and other approaches 
focused on how a firm could manipulate stable elements in its context to attack the 
competition using a Machiavellian mindset (David J. Teece et al., 1997). However, a void 
existed in the literature about how firms could strategize to adapt and succeed in 
turbulent environments. How did managers in unstable environments compete with and 
gain advantage over their competitors? How did they sustain that advantage? How did 
they redeploy internal and external competences? Teece, Pisano, and Shuen asked these 
questions, which motivated them to look inside the firms for an approach that could 
explain this success in a Schumpeterian mindset (David Teece & Pisano, 1994) where 
entrepreneurial innovations have an important role as a key driver in economic growth.  
Capabilities are a collection of high-level learned, patterned, and repetitious 
behaviors, processes, and routines that an organization can perform better than its 
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competition (Winter & Nelson, 1982). Dynamic capabilities are the antecedent 
organizational and strategic routines by which managers alter their resource base—
acquire and shed resources, integrate them together, and recombine them to generate 
new, value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Grant, 1996). As such, 
dynamic capabilities complement traditional strategic thinking based on structure and 
strategic position within an industry. The aim of DCT is understand how firms sustain an 
advantage over and compete with other firms using dynamic capabilities to face and 
respond to environmental changes—as well as to create those changes.  
In their paper (1997), Teece, Pisano, and Shuen presented three categories for 
determining a firm’s distinctive competence and dynamic capabilities: processes, 
positions, and paths. A process can be described as “a specific ordering of work activities 
across time and place, with a beginning and an end, and clearly defined inputs and 
outputs: a structure for action” (Davenport, 1993; Sandberg et al., 2014). That is, 
processes are the way things are done, also referred to as routines. Dynamic capabilities 
are identifiable and specific routines; indeed, researchers have described DCT as 
“routines to learn routines” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). Processes and routines are 
simply how managers and the organization (as a living organism) do things (David J. 
Teece et al., 1997). According to Teece et al., organizational processes have three roles: 
coordination and integration (internal activities coordinated by the firm’s managers); 
learning (the process by which repetition leads to process mastery); and reconfiguration 
and transformation (adaptation through change in rapidly changing environments). 
Eisenhardt and Martin outlined dynamic capabilities as the organizational and strategic 
routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets emerge, collide, 
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split, evolve, and die. Managers create a firm’s routines through process design, but 
culture affects and molds these routines, adding value and making them difficult to 
replicate (David J. Teece et al., 1997).  
Position refers to a firm’s specific assets, such as specialized equipment or a 
strategic plant, as well as the knowledge assets that are difficult to trade. Teece et al. 
described eight asset categories: 
• Technological assets, including know-how and protected instruments and 
intellectual properties 
• Complementary assets, related to producing and delivering new products 
• Financial assets, including available cash, available credit, access to funds or 
investors 
• Reputational assets, including good historical liaisons with stakeholders as clients, 
suppliers, banks and public institutions 
• Structural assets, including the formal and informal structures of the firm’s 
organization 
• Institutional assets, such as laws, rules, and government offices 
• Market assets, including distribution network and logistic resources 
• Organizational boundaries, that is efficiency, power, competence and identity 
Paths refer to the mobility in the firm’s current functions and the positions 
(opportunities) ahead (David J. Teece et al., 1997). Paths represent the firm’s history and 
how its managers have addressed objectives and solved problems. These paths are 
important because they shape and represent the entire repertoire of the firm’s routines. 
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Dynamic capabilities respond differently depending on the nature of the firm’s 
market. In moderately dynamic markets—with stable industry structures, well-defined 
boundaries, identifiable business models and players, and predictable change—dynamic 
capabilities such as routines or processes are embedded in cumulative knowledge that, 
once codified, presents predictable knowledge (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Constance E. 
Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003; Winter & Nelson, 1982). In high-velocity markets—
in which industry structure and boundaries are unclear, players come and go from, 
change is unpredictable, and routines are intentionally simple to allow for emergent 
adaptation (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000)—knowledge  production must be fast to respond 
to new situations and changes in the context. Researchers have defined dynamic 
capabilities in various ways, some researchers define them as the capabilities that require 
firms to adapt and change by building, integrating, or reconfiguring their resources and 
capabilities (Constance E. Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003). A resource is a tangible 
or intangible asset that a firm owns and can exploit. Dynamic capabilities show how 
managers use the firm’s resources to gain advantage. Accordingly, Eisenhardt et al. 
defined dynamic capabilities as the firm’s processes that use resources—specifically, the 
processes that integrate, reconfigure, gain, and release resources—to match and even 
create market change (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). According to Helfat et al. (2007), a 
dynamic capability is the firm’s capacity to purposefully create, extend, and modify its 
resource base (Helfat et al., 2009; Constance E Helfat & Margaret A Peteraf, 2003; J. A. 
Miles, 2012). Previous scholars and theorist believed that assets were a major contributor 
to a firm’s competitiveness, while more recent theories assert that it is in the resources 
themselves that the greatest potential strategic contribution resides (David J. Teece et al., 
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1997). Physical assets such as inventory, buildings, plants, and vehicles can be 
purchased, while resources must be developed. 
DCT helps researchers and practitioners understand which of a firm’s resources 
strongly affect its performance. To create value, such resources must be valuable, rare, 
inimitable, and non-substitutable (VRIN) (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). A firm’s 
competitive advantage flows from the exploitation, evolution, and recombination VRIN 
and other resources to create new resources.  A firm’s strategic routines—how things are 
done and which manager does them—also alter the firm’s resource base (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000). 
Following our first research stage (2014), our team used this resource view as a 
foundation for building the Integrated Model, which identifies three types of resources—
physical, knowledge, and organizational—that a firm and the BOP network (local 
distributors) can exploit.  
ANSA’s resources provide the foundation for the collaboration: 
• Physical resources, including assets such as warehouses, logistical equipment, a 
chain of stores, and IT equipment 
• Knowledge resources, including 37 years of experience in the field and 
knowledge about technology (crops and products) and the market 
• Organizational resources, including employees, a suppliers network, and a 
financial network 
The BOP network of local distributors adds to this collaboration: 
• Physical resources, including the agro-shops located in the farmers’ vicinity 
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• Knowledge resources, such as local market information and customer data 
• Organizational resources, including proximity to farmers and existing 
relationships with them 
IV.2 Option-Driven Strategizing 
ODS brings a dramatically new view of uncertainty. Rather than merely outlining 
a specific path, options reflect incremental decision-making about resource investments 
to frame future actions (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Timothy A. Luehrman, 1998; Sandberg 
et al., 2014). ODS recognizes that, in some situations, uncertainty is good, and helps us 
understand that the greater the uncertainty, the greater the opportunity for value creation 
(Faulkner, 1996). Effective options thinking requires managers do three things well 
(Fichman, Keil, & Tiwana, 2005):  
• recognize and enhance opportunities to create options, 
• value those options in some way, and 
• manage projects in a way that fully extracts this value 
ODS is a valuable tool for practitioners, because it helps them value the impact of 
diverse strategies. Some strategy researchers suggest that corporate decisions typically 
have two stages. First, the firm makes a small investment to test the water and thereby 
earn the right to participate in the project. Bowman calls this stage the “purchase of the 
option.” Once data is collected and the firm fully understands the project, it then makes a 
second and larger investment, “exercising the option” (Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001). 
This is similar to when poker players pay to see a rival player’s cards.  
 41 
Despite the theoretical attractiveness of the options approach, its use by managers 
appears to be limited (Bowman & Moskowitz, 2001). Most managers prefer more 
analytical tools—such as net present value (NPV), to obtain the overall values of 
incoming and outgoing cash flows over time, and return of investment (ROI) to calculate 
the investor’s benefit—because they are focused on what Fichman et al. (2005) called the 
“must do” elements and forgetting to consider those that a firm’s “may do.” Some 
researchers and practitioners do not like using tables or decision trees, preferring instead 
to use software applications. However, tables and decision trees offer advantages over 
decision software, including that they make counterintuitive outcomes more visible and 
understandable (Faulkner, 1996). Strategies are produced through the sequential 
elimination of items in an option chain (Bowman & Hurry, 1993). In this chain, 
sequential steps operate as filters, diluting the options set until an adoptable option is 
found. Moreover, sometimes new options rise from this diluting process (see Figure 6).  
Option chains support a systematic search for opportunities beyond the baseline 
implementation (Fichman et al., 2005). Once the chain is filtered to include only viable 
options, managers can classify and further dilute the set of opportunities that remain.  
Options in the options chain are classified in six ways: 
• Shadow option: An option that awaits recognition, but has not been yet 
identifiable 
• Available option: An option in the bundle that it is identifiable and awaits 
recognition 
• Real option: An option in which the firm makes a small investment to obtain 
preferential access to future investment 
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• Actionable option: An option that has been analyzed and found to be both 
desirable and feasible 
• Struck option: An option that is activated through a larger investment 
• Realized option: An option that has been exercised  
The option set rises from an organization’s resources, capabilities, and 
experiences with previous investments. For an option to exist in a firm’s context, 
resources and capabilities must first offer future opportunities, as Figure 6 shows 
(Bowman & Hurry, 1993).  
 
Figure 6 The options chain 
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Learning plays a strategic part in this process: organizational learning brings with 
the set of organizational historic moments a list of future actions, because options 
acknowledge managerial flexibility to act in ways that avoid potential losses while 
preserving potential gains. A project with an embedded option is more valuable that one 
without (Fichman et al., 2005).  
Using ODS is advantageous because it helps firms in the process of identifying 
and evaluating opportunities by increasing the number of considered options (Bowman & 
Hurry, 1993) and changing how managers view non-options, which can then be 
transformed into available options in some cases.  
IV.3 The Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing 
Based on our early findings using DCT and ODS, we created the Integrated 
Model for BOP Strategizing (Figure 7). We followed a process in which we collected 
data and analyzed it iteratively with the purpose of identifying options that were 
available, actionable, and realizable through the process of sensing, seizing and 
reconfiguring (David J Teece, 2007). Available options are potential strategies relevant 
for the firm’s opportunities that were dormant and awaiting recognition. In DCT terms, 
they can be identified through sensing new opportunities as an activity similar to 
scanning, creating and learning, interpreting the outcomes. Actionable options are those 
that the firm might be able to exploit. They can be articulated through seizing, which 
refers to developing the sensed new opportunities (technological or market) into possible 
products, processes or services. Realized options are those already exercised or those to 
be implemented, by the firm based on their expansiveness, profitably, and ability to 
quickly achieve the desired outcomes. They can be developed in DCT terms through 
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reconfiguration as the identification, judicious selection and calibration of technological 
and market opportunities through the selecting of technologies and products attributes, 
and the design of the business model and commitment of resources to invest in 
opportunities that would lead a firm to growth and profitability (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; 
Sandberg et al., 2014; David J Teece, 2007). Through this options lens, and actions 
undertaken we obtained a view of the organization and the stakeholder’s resources as a 
bundle of options (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; Fichman et al., 2005; Sandberg et al., 2014).  
 
Figure 7 Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing 
Our model has three iterative steps: 
1. Define the strategy’s goals. Managers can facilitate strategy design by using 
additional theoretical framings. Any chosen framework must help managers 
achieve a sufficient understanding of the context and circumstance in which the 
strategy is being created. At ANSA, for example, we supported our framing by 
using the Asset Hexagon (Penh, 2009) to better understand the BOP context. At 
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this stage, ODS is extremely useful because it helps decision makers enlist, 
understand, and choose the strategy’s realizable options. 
2. Use DCT to identify, classify, and enlist resources. Resources must be classified 
as either knowledge, physical, or organizational. Further, firms must identify how 
they are going to develop, reconfigure, and deploy these resources to meet the 
new goals (Cazares et al., 2015; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Hernandez, 
Quinonez, & Mathiassen, 2014; Tashman & Marano, 2009; David J Teece, 2007; 
David J. Teece et al., 1997). Once a firm accounts for it’s own resources, it must 
then account for the resources of anyone in its network that it wants to strategize 
with to co-create value. The firm’s network includes the complete set of 
stakeholders: suppliers, clients, financiers, stockholders, and so on. 
3. Analyze the available options. These options are those that arise from the data 
gathered, using ODS theory to dilute the options from available options to 
actionable options and finally to realized options, through the actions of sensing, 
seizing and reconfiguring. 
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V CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The world is a much bigger lab 
—Donald A. Wollheim 
In the real world, private firms face needs that demand fast solutions from 
investigators, who must nonetheless maintain a rigorous academic structure to ensure 
their support is appropriate and rooted in evidence. To facilitate this, business, 
organizational, and management research must be embedded in stakeholders’ reality; as 
Andrew H. Van de Ven (Van de Ven, 2007) put it, “Engagement is a relationship that 
involves negotiation and collaboration between researchers and practitioners in a 
learning community; such a community jointly produces knowledge that can both 
advance the scientific enterprise and enlighten a community of practitioners” (p. 6). Our 
team’s research was conducted according to the engaged methodology of action research, 
with the goal of being as involved as possible with the firm and its stakeholders through 
direct engagement with practice (Mathiassen, 2002). Hence, we aspired to create 
scientific knowledge, while at the same time seeking solutions to or improvements in 
real-life practical problems (Elden & Chisholm, 1993; McKay & Marshall, 2001). 
This dissertation involves the initial design of AgroEstacion through the first part 
of the action research engaging with stakeholders—that is, the firm, local distributors, 
and BOP corn farmers—in the corn production process in Mexico’s western, central, and 
southern states. Drawing on DCT, we identified the stakeholders’ physical, knowledge, 
and organizational resources, and analyzed them through the ODS lens in order to select 
the realizable ones. Based on the first stage of our research, in which we collected data 
(starting in May 2014), we published an article on our early findings and 
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recommendations to the firm (Cazares et al., 2015). This dissertation also includes the 
second stage of our action research: strategizing, developing, and implementing the 
AgroEstacion project as a new franchise business. AgroEstacion, which was crafted 
according to industry requirements and the Mexican context, will co-create value among 
the three main players:  
• ANSA and its AgroEstacion subsidiary, 
• a network of selected local distributors, and  
• the BOP corn farmers  
In the research’s first stage, we revealed key resources across the stakeholder 
network and classified a set of available options for value co-creation. ODS helped us 
decide which options could be made actionable and eventually realized (Constance E. 
Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003). These early findings allowed us to propose the 
conceptual model for strategizing BOP value co-creation combining DCT with ODS 
(Figure 7). Our Integrated Model has two main poles: the firm, with its physical, 
knowledge, and organizational resources; and the BOP network, with its complementary 
set of physical, knowledge, and organizational resources (Cazares et al., 2015).  
The second stage will continue the practical work of implementing AgroEstacion 
jointly with ANSA and its select local distributors, and targeting BOP corn farmers. In 
this process, I will apply, validate, and further develop our proposed conceptual model 
(Figure 7). Hence, this dissertation will leverage this two-stage collaboration at ANSA to 
provide knowledge and guidance that firms can use to build and improve their 
collaboration with the BOP in a way that not only increases their market share and 
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produces more profit, but also builds knowledge and social value that improves the lives 
of its allies and the BOP community (Klein, 2008). 
Working closely with practitioners in the environment in which they collaborate 
and face daily problems challenges us to seek applicable solutions using the firm and the 
real world as our laboratory (Baskerville & Wood-Harper, 1996). Action research guides 
us to comprehend the context and the changes needed to apply BOP thinking to business 
practice. Action research also puts us closer to the stakeholders’ mindset, and helps us 
better understand it.  
V.1 Collaborative Practice Research 
“[Action research] aims to contribute both to the practical concerns of people in an 
immediate problematic situation and to the goals of social science, by joint collaboration 
within a mutually acceptable ethical framework.” 
—Robert N. Rapoport (1970: 499) 
As action researchers, we both take action and create knowledge (Coghlan & 
Brannick, 2014). This research applies Collaborative Practice Research (CPR) 
(Mathiassen, 2002), a form of action research aimed at groups of people; the goal is to 
achieve social or professional change in their practices by working in partnership with 
each other (David Coghlan, 2014). The pragmatic axis of this type of action research is 
change, based on the mutual benefit of people working together with different but 
complementary knowledge, skills, and responsibilities. In our study, the dissertation 
author and primary researcher serves as an advisor and enabler for the firm’s top 
executives: the President, CEO, the Chief Commercial Officer (CCO), board members, 
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the task force team, and ANSA managers, as well as for select distributors for the 
AgroEstacion project.  
CPR emphasizes the co-creation of knowledge, bringing together researchers with 
different approaches facilitates knowledge creation for stakeholders. The first research 
stage included the dissertation author and people from different industries with diverse 
expertise. One held a top position at CARE, an NGO that provides aid to emergent 
markets, especially in rural areas, and who had deep experience in the agricultural sector 
of poor countries. Another held a vice-president position at a top private university in 
Mexico, and was deeply engaged with the BOP literature. The third was the dissertation 
advisor, a professor whose expertise focuses on action research and other specific 
organizational theories. It was a group “whose aspirations were for group of people to 
achieve social and professional change through working in partnership with each other, 
sometimes including external aid” (David Coghlan, 2014).  
In the first stage, the research team reviewed cases in the literature about firms 
engaged in the BOP market and BOP strategizing. Three examples made particular sense 
in the context of our investigation: CEMEX (Segel et al., 2006), Kenya’s micro-
franchising model (Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011); and Bangladesh’s 
commercial networking through entrepreneurial women (McKague & Siddiquee, 2014). 
Theses cases offered insights into the path that the research team was visualizing. After 
discussions on framing lenses, we selected DCT, ODS, and the Asset Hexagon 
framework to develop our research. We initiated the first stage in late April 2014, when 
we conducted a GSU workshop that presented a collaboration proposal to ANSA’s four 
top executives: 
 50 
• The company’s president and founder, a 68-year-old agronomist engineer with 44 
years’ experience in the agrichemical business 
• The CEO, a 56-year-old agronomist engineer with 32 years’ experience in the 
agrichemical business and 22 years’ experience working at the firm  
• The CCO, a 40-year-old agronomist engineer with 20 years’ experience working 
at the firm 
• The CBO, a 43-year-old business major with an MBA with 24 years’ experience 
in the industry; he is also the dissertation author and a member of the research 
team 
In this first workshop, we established trust and commitment. ANSA’s executives 
accepted our research team’s proposal on the premise that: “Change needed to be made, 
as we cannot keep doing business as usual”(Cazares et al., 2015). The workshop revealed 
a list of challenges, which in turn encouraged the research team to produce a series of 
available strategic options for ANSA. The most critical challenge was the intention of 
several of the firm’s MNC suppliers to shorten the supply chain, thereby bypassing the 
firm. Two other challenges also put the firm’s sustainability at risk: 
• Some of the firm’s distributors who were once small local businesses had become 
medium-sized firms, with a heavy and influential presence. That is, they were 
“Ants becoming Elephants” (Cazares et al., 2015) 
• Other distributors had no credit options, as financial institutions were absent from 
the farming business in Mexico 
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From these challenges, the research team applied ODS to draw up a list of 
options: 
1. Develop a BOP–MNC joint venture (JV). With this option, ANSA aspired to 
reduce the uncertainty the MNCs had about the firm’s participation in the market 
and also to shorten the supply chain 
2. Design special agrochemical packaging for the BOP farmer. The firm identified 
the need for smaller packing of agrichemical solutions to better suit BOP farmers 
3. Identify strategies for engaging BOP farmers. The firm understood its lack of 
presence in the minds of BOP farmers and the importance of changing this 
4. Develop tools to help BOP farmers self-organize. Such tools could include 
information centers; information tools, such as media; community centers; and 
workshops. A joint effort between ANSA and its local distributors in this area 
could give the firm access to many BOP farmers and help them use the tools to 
transfer knowledge and technology to them 
5. Establish a joint effort of ANSA and local distributors to target BOP farmers. The 
firm has more than 1,350 distributors in its network, an important resource that 
gives it a strong market position. The opportunity here would be to engage with 
distributors who were searching for a strategy to target the BOP farmer 
6. Develop a franchise business model, also in a joint effort with select local 
distributors, to target the BOP farmers 
Aided by constant communication with ANSA’s executives, the research team 
applied ODS to dilute the options set from available to actionable opportunities (Table 5). 
Then, to further reduce the set to realizable options, the research team interacted with the 
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firm’s stakeholders: the MNC suppliers, the local distributors, BOP farmers, the firm’s 
regional managers, sale representatives, administrative personal, and industry experts. 
ANSA was and is committed to this process for both pragmatic and principled reasons. 
The pragmatic arguments are based on a strategic desire to achieve change in the business 
(David Coghlan, 2014), while the principled arguments express a particular set of beliefs 
about how change in social settings should be achieved and about the power people gain 
by working together (David Coghlan, 2014). 
Our research team performed open interviews through its two Spanish-speaking 
members, as well as in workshops and focus groups where the options were discussed, 
polished, and improved. We also spent two days traveling and visiting the fields, where 
we interviewed farmers. In addition, we visited small town stores and interviewed local 
distributors, as well as conducting interviews with MNCs’ managers. We heard 
complaints, criticisms, and suggestions that further illuminated our strategy development. 
As we continue this research, we will follow-up on this knowledge cycle with interviews 
and focus groups with stakeholders to capture recent developments and validate data 
from our previous analysis. Action research has been criticized for lack of rigor, but we 
believe it is one of the more engaging approaches, providing rich insights into the real-
world problem setting (McKay & Marshall, 2001). To accomplish rigor in this process, 
our CPR follows Robert Burns’ 1994 dual-cycle approach (Burns, 1990) as adapted by 
Judy McKay and Peter Marshall in 2001 (McKay & Marshall, 2001). 
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Table 5 Options available in ANSA 
Initial Set of Options Revised Set of Options 
1. Develop a BOP joint venture with 
select multinational suppliers  
2. Offer specific products and 
services to BOP farmers 
1. Offer specific products and services 
to BOP farmers 
3. Identify strategies for engaging 
BOP farmers  
4. Develop tools for BOP self-
organization (information centers, 
community meetings, workshops, and so on) 
2. Identify strategies for engaging BOP 
farmers 
5. Provide support for helping 
distributors target BOP farmers 
3. Provide support for helping 
distributors target BOP farmers 
6. Develop a franchise model 
targeting BOP farmers 
4. Develop a franchise model targeting 
BOP farmers 
 5. Support commercialization of BOP produce (buy and develop wholesale markets) 
V.2 The Dual-Cycle Approach 
Our action research follows the dual-cycle approach suggested by (McKay & 
Marshall, 2001), which emphasizes the problem-solving interest, the research interest, 
and the ongoing interactions between them, as Figure 8 shows (Chiasson, Germonprez, & 
Mathiassen, 2009).  
The first part of our research yielded practical outcomes: the initial design of a 
new business platform, AgroEstacion, that would strength the presence of ANSA in the 
market, improve the business process of the local distributor, and push benefits 
(technological, financial, commercial) to the BOP corn farmers. At the same time, this 
initial stage also yielded preliminary theoretical results: the Integrated Model for 
strategizing BOP business options (Figure 7). During our initial research, the problem-
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solving cycle consisted of four phases; the problem-solving cycle in the research’s second 
stage will also include four phases (see Table 6). 
 
Figure 8 Problem solving and research cycle in action research 
Our problem-solving cycle began in March 2014 with a debate about ANSA’s 
challenges and possible opportunities, and a review of several cases in which firms had 
successfully entered the BOP market and made an economic, financial, and social 
difference. In April 2014, the research team organized the first workshop with ANSA 
executives, which was aimed at engaging the researchers and practitioners in a cross-
knowledge process and designing a list of available options. The first column in Table 6 
lists the options discussed in that workshop. As noted earlier, our research team 
challenged the executive team to adjust their mindsets and explore BOP opportunities in 
their industry. We called this first problem-solving phase, “Committing to BOP 
Strategizing.” Then, in the second phase, “Identifying Available Options,” we discussed 
the firm’s challenges and opportunities and designed available BOP options. Next, we 
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began the data collection process. From July 16–20, 2014, we interviewed farmers, 
distributors, and ANSA personnel; we also interacted with the executive team, and held 
focus groups with managers from ANSA and two of the firm’s suppliers. This third 
phase, “Interacting with the Firm and the BOP network,” consisted mostly of collecting, 
analyzing, and reducing data, following Miles and Huberman’s data analysis approach, 
including the iterative steps of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing 
(Chapter 6 has more details on this). 
In phase four, “Developing Actionable Options,” our research team continued 
meeting with our advisor, and we held a focus group with ANSA executives in which we 
developed actionable options. It was in this phase—during a workshop at ANSA 
headquarters—that we developed our Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing (Figure 7). 
Following this new model led our team and the practitioners to select the micro-
franchising approach as a major option for the BOP strategy. 
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Table 6 The problem-solving cycle phases 
Problem-Solving Cycle Phases 
1. Committing 
to BOP 
strategizing 
• Exploring strategic and ethical business issues within ANSA 
• Conducting a workshop with ANSA executives 
• Discussing ANSA’s history and its current situation, challenges, and 
sensing opportunities 
• Discussing the BOP proposition and cases 
2. Identifying 
available 
options 
• Conduct workshops and Skype meetings with research and Executive 
team  
• Analyze ANSA challenges and sense opportunities 
• Identify available BOP options 
3. Interacting 
with ANSA 
and the BOP 
network 
• Collect data and sense-analyze/dilute options 
• Conduct workshops with Task force and customers 
• Interact and discuss with executive team  
4. Developing 
actionable 
options  
• Conduct workshops with research team, executive team and task force  
• Develop/seize actionable options 
• Conduct workshops with ANSA executives 
• Select/reconfigure major option (micro-franchising) 
5. Crafting 
AgroEstacion 
   
• Transform task force into AgroEstacion team 
• Design AgroEstacion business franchise concept and select distributors 
for partnership 
• Design AgroEstacion plan, including processes, models, and manuals 
• Beginning of initial training process for franchisees (downstream) 
• Sign bailment contract (equipment) 
• Handle legal issues (registration, contracts, and trademarks) 
• Build the model store in Tlajomulco town. 
6. Strategizing 
process options  
• Design the commercial and cross-learning processes (for the firm and 
franchisees) 
• Conduct follow-up workshops with the research and AgroEstacion 
teams  
7. Engaging 
franchisees  
• Launch first two franchise stores 
• Initiate the second training process for franchisees 
• Design the Growth Forum 
8. Networking for 
expansion 
• Develop the Executive Advisory Board 
• Introduce the AgroEstacion business model to suppliers and 
governmental officials 
• Scout candidates for the next two franchisees 
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The first stage of our research concluded in December 2014. We detailed our 
findings in a preliminary article, “Strategizing Value Co-creation with Poor Farmers in a 
Mexican Agribusiness,” by Rafael Hernández Cazares, Late M. Lawson-Lartego, Sergio 
Quinonez, and Lars Mathiassen. Our second research stage launched as our first stage 
ended—in December 2014—when we decided to continue our action research to further 
develop our Integrated Model and realize the selected options. 
As in our first stage, this second action research stage also consists of a four-
phase problem-solving cycle. In phase one, “Crafting AgroEstacion,” we transformed the 
task force into AgroEstacion’s management team; these team members now work full-
time for the project rather than continuing to divide their time between ANSA’s previous 
activities and AgroEstacion. The dissertation author supervised the development of this 
new team, which worked with the research team to design the firm’s business franchise 
concept and select two distributors with which to partner. In this phase, we also designed 
the new company’s processes, business model, and manuals, beginning with the training 
process for the two selected distributors. Also in this phase, ANSA provided 
equipment—including furniture, computers, printers, and satellite-based Internet 
access—to those distributors. In this fifth “crafting” phase, the creation occurred: the new 
business entity took a solid, organized form that distributors, suppliers, farmers, and other 
stakeholders can see. 
In the sixth phase, “Strategizing Process Options,” we exchanged knowledge 
between the two franchisees and AgroEstacion’s managers team about the corn 
commercialization process. That process included the crop contract process, the farmers’ 
fund application process, and the buyer contact process. In this phase, knowledge sharing 
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played a key role; in Figure 7, we illustrate this through the “Informs/Develop Route” 
where arrows cross between the “Firm Network,” “BOP Network” and “Strategizing” 
boxes. 
In the seventh phase, AgroEstacion engaged with its franchisees, by inaugurating 
the first two stores in September 2015. The franchisees’ personnel participated in the 
second training process, and we launched the first Growth Forum (Foro De Crecimiento), 
designed to engage the franchisees, AgroEstacion, and other stakeholders in a deeper 
cross-knowledge practice. In the Growth Forum, participants exchanged knowledge and 
experience, such as franchisees’ diverse challenges and how they faced them. Further, 
facts were analyzed with the goal of improving AgroEstacion’s performance in terms of 
its products and services for farmers and franchisees—including farmer experiences and 
needs, franchisee experience and operations, partnership evaluation and improvement, 
and agronomic updates. 
In the eighth phase, the research team and the practitioners began a networking 
procedure aimed at expansion. We planned to develop an Executive Advisory Board, led 
by ANSA’s board president and confirmed by including the top executives from two 
MNCs allied with ANSA, a government official in the agricultural sector, business 
people from the agricultural industry, two financial officials from banks interested in the 
agricultural industry, a financial advisor, and a business college professor. The Advisory 
Board’s objective will be to engage people with deep knowledge in the business and wide 
networks, so they can contribute experience, knowledge, and social networks to the new 
company. We also planned to scout for the next two franchisees candidates in this last 
phase, following the path we hiked to choose our initial franchisees. 
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As Figure 8 shows, research and problem-solving cycles constantly interact, 
which creates an effect in which one cycle impacts the other (Chiasson et al., 2009). The 
research cycle is focused on the scientific goals and the researcher’s aspiration for 
knowledge. It is the cycle in which research team members expect to solve problems and 
add new knowledge (as Table 1 shows). In the first stage of our action research, we 
contributed to knowledge by combining DCT, ODS, and the Asset Hexagon into an 
Integrated Model (Figure 7). In the second stage of our action research, we’re seeking to 
contribute knowledge by presenting a detailed process and propositions for strategizing 
the BOP market to co-create value, “contributing to knowledge differently from what 
positivist science can contribute” (Susman & Evered, 1978). Table 7 summarizes the key 
events of our research cycle. 
Table 7 Research cycle activities 
Research 
Stage 
Research Activities 
Action Research: 
Stage 1 
• Introduce the BOP literature 
• Review select BOP cases relevant to the firm 
• Introduce theoretical frameworks: Dynamic Capabilities Theory (DCT), 
Option-Driven Strategizing (ODS), and Asset Hexagon 
• Begin action research 
• Collect data 
• Apply ODS theory  
• Design the Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing 
• Conclude first action research stage and write/publish preliminary 
findings 
Action Research: 
Stage 2 
• Apply Integrated model to create a new entity 
• Follow-up on data collection to validate and capture recent 
developments 
• Conduct detailed analyses of all data from both action research stages 
• Develop a comprehensive empirical account 
• Further develop the model and propositions 
• Draw conclusions 
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VI CHAPTER 6: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
VI.1 Data Collection, Stage One 
In the first research stage, the goal of data collection was to help the executive 
team develop and implement a sustainable strategy targeting the BOP, as well as to 
develop new empirical insights into how managers might strategize the co-creation of 
value with the BOP. In that first stage, we collected data through three workshops with 
ANSA executives; 24 semi-structured, in-person interviews; a focus group with key 
stakeholders in ANSA’s value chain; and field trips to rural areas in Mexico’s western 
states, where we visited the distributor stores and interviewed BOP farmers.  
The research team met every two weeks to review data and share experiences. In 
addition, the total commitment of the firms’ executives meant that we had full access to 
secondary data through internal communication documents, including financial 
information, sales reports, supplier comments, the distributor and farmer network 
database, company presentations, emails, notes from informal meetings, and other written 
materials. These materials complemented our understanding of the problem and validated 
our initial conclusions. Data collection for this first stage of action research began in our 
first workshop with ANSA executives at Georgia State University in Atlanta. We 
subsequently held two more workshops with the same executive team and a focus group 
with ANSA managers and the newly created task force. Table 8 summarizes this initial 
data collection process, which we conducted from March through December 2014. 
VI.2 Data Collection, Stage Two 
In the second stage of this action research, I collected qualitative data from 
primary and secondary sources. Because I had a dual role in this project—as researcher 
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and practitioner—I had access to all the data that was produced at ANSA and most of the 
data from secondary sources. Data collection began in early 2015, when I began actively 
observing and taking notes during relevant AgroEstacion meetings. I also conducted 
interview and focus group follow-ups with people participating in the first action research 
stage. The goal of these follow-ups was to validate key findings from the original 
interviews and focus groups and to add new details about the latest developments in 
ANSA’s strategy for co-creating value with its customers. 
I observed and documented two types of formal meetings: those that 
AgroEstacion managers and ANSA executives held with indirect project suppliers—
including lawyers, architects, construction engineers, and IT experts—and those of the 
board of directors, when the discussions related to AgroEstacion. Finally, I used 
ethnographic methods to capture additional information by observing participants, which 
typically produces the most interesting and evocative accounts of organizational life (Van 
Maanen, 2011). I began collecting this out-of-schedule data (OSD) in January 2015, 
exploiting the opportunity I had due to my full-time participation and onsite presence at 
ANSA. However, I conducted no interview or focus group follow-ups until September 2, 
2015, when I received authorization by GSU’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Table 9 
summarizes my data sources and collection methods for the second action research stage. 
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Table 8 Data sources for the first stage of action research 
Primary Secondary 
v Workshops with ANSA executives (3) 
v Research team meetings to analyze workshop 
material and advances (bi-weekly) 
v Focus group with middle management team 
v  Semi-structured interviews: 
• Farmers (10) 
• Distributors (6) 
• Regional managers (3) 
• Suppliers’ executives (2) 
• Industry experts (1) 
• Potential partners (2) 
v Staff meetings: 
• Task force recruiting 
• Legal consultancy (2) 
• Business plan (5) 
v Field observations: 
• Store layouts 
• Warehouse operations 
v ANSA documents: 
• Market and industry 
information 
• Sales reports 
• Distributors’ data 
• Farmers’ data 
v Research team documents: 
• Available strategic 
options 
• Actionable options 
• Work plan for task 
force 
This second stage of data collection focused on documenting data related to the 
last four “realizable options and seizing action” that our team developed with 
AgroEstacion: 
• Crafting AgroEstacion 
• Strategizing process options 
• Engaging franchisees 
• Networking for expansion 
The process of documenting how these four phases developed provided primary 
and secondary data, which we documented through observing participants and 
conducting follow-ups as described above. 
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VI.3 Data Analysis 
To analyze the project’s voluminous data, I used a filter suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (2013) for qualitative data analysis (Figure 9). This qualitative data analysis 
consisted of three activities: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and 
verification (M. B. Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013; Singh, 2011). As noted earlier, 
my goal in collecting and reducing this data was to use our theoretical framework to 
understand the context and the factors contributing to ANSA’s challenges (Table 1). This 
process was continuous, and did not work in a strictly flat timeline. Given this, I began 
collecting data before I completed my dissertation abstract and continued collecting data 
even as I began writing up the results section. In action research, you become an observer 
as well as a passenger on the journey. Nonetheless, I ultimately stopped gathering data in 
mid December 2015. 
Table 9 Primary and secondary data sources 
Primary Data Sources Secondary Data Sources 
v Follow-up interviews: 
Executive team (3)  
v Observe quarterly board 
meeting (1)  
v Follow-up interviews: 
AgroEstacion staff (4) 
v Follow-up interviews: 
Distributors who became 
AgroEstacion franchisees (2) 
v Follow-up interviews: select 
focus group participants (1) 
v Researcher workshops (3) 
v Observe legal meetings (2) 
v Participant observation (4) 
v Follow-up observations: 
Distributor’s business operation 
following ANSA business process 
training (various) 
v Internal documents and events: 
• Meeting notes 
• E-mails and memos 
• Sales reports 
• Hallway meetings  
• Business plans 
• Legal documents 
• Funding applications and presentations 
• AgroEstacion memos 
• Ethnographical note taking 
(observation/reflection) 
• Business Plan presented by 
AgroEstacion general manager  
v External documents: 
• Practitioners Journals 
• Informal discussion with suppliers and 
industry experts 
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As described earlier, the second part of the action research focused on two key 
tasks: gathering and analyzing data from the problem-solving cycle’s four last phases 
(Table 7) and documenting the process throughout those phases. As Figure 9 shows, I 
created reports for each phase, beginning with what Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 
called the data reduction process (M. B. Miles et al., 2013). 
Data reduction. I started data reduction at the beginning of the project by 
designing both a research question and problem context description that focused on the 
essence of the research itself. Thus, when I paid attention to a problem—in this case, the 
company’s problem—the process of collecting and reducing data began. To reduce the 
data, I retained only data that confirmed my field notes and initial records (M. B. Miles et 
al., 2013).  
Data collection began immediately, in the first workshop we held with ANSA 
executives in 2014, in which our research team outlined the firm’s context and problems. 
Data collection continued when the task force presented the early research outcomes to 
the firm’s stakeholders and distributors, and we took notes on their reactions, comments, 
and opinions. The final four phases of the problem-solving cycle were designed through a 
joint effort between me, my dissertation advisor, and AgroEstacion’s managers.  
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Figure 9 The research project's approach to data analysis (Singh, 2011) 
My first step to reduce the data was to review all the data collected and discard 
any information unrelated to the research. This included meeting notes on issues 
unrelated to the research topic and AgroEstacion, as well as data collected that did not 
qualify as a participant observation or a follow-up, in keeping with the boundaries 
established by GSU’s IRB. Because action research provides numerous opportunities to 
collect data, researchers must protect the involved individuals and respect the limits 
provided (in this case) by the IRB.  
I translated the notes from the initial workshops, the audios of the interviews and 
focus groups from the first stage and the follow-ups, and the notes from the second stage 
of participant observation from Spanish to English and uploaded them into the NVivo 
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software. Then, after reducing the data, I copied it—along with emails and memos from 
the second stage into separate files in NVivo to facilitate easier access and control.  
Table 10 NVivo structual map 
Data files Codes 
• Internal  
v ANSA employees 
interviews  
v BOP distributors 
interviews (with follow-ups) 
v BOP farmers interviews 
v Industry experts 
interviews 
v Lawyers meetings 
v Research team members / 
v Suppliers interviews (with 
follow-ups) 
v Task force members 
interviews (with follow-ups) 
v Top Management Team 
interviews (with follow-ups) 
• External documents 
v Emails and memos 
 
• Resource 
v BOP network 
o Knowledge 
o Organizational 
o Physical 
v Firm network 
o Knowledge 
o Organizational 
o Physical 
• Options 
v Sensing available options  
v Seizing actionable options  
v Reconfiguring realized 
options  
• Value co-creation 
• Problem-solving cycle phases 
v Committing to BOP 
strategizing 
v Identifying available options 
v Interacting with firm and 
BOP network 
v Developing actionable 
options 
v Crafting AgroEstacion 
v Strategizing process options 
v Engaging franchisees 
v Networking for expansion 
• Source  
After uploading the data for both stages, I proceeded to create nodes. I created 
five nodes and 19 subnodes, reflecting the Integrated Model (see Figure 7). Next, I 
reviewed the transcriptions of the reduced data and manually coded the information. I 
also selected phrases and statements relevant to my research objectives and classified 
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them into specific nodes. Table 10 summarizes the filing and coding structure of my 
NVivo project, which helped me with both data reduction and data display. Table 11 
elaborates on the structure, describing the specific codes used in my data analysis; 
explaining the domain, location, and definition of the codes; and pointing to references 
supporting the codes. 
Based on the results of reducing data from my two research phases, I designed 
what Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña call the data display (M. B. Miles et al., 2013) as 
Figure 9 shows.  
Data display. To present my research findings, I narrated the research events, 
supporting them with the phrases and statements coded in NVivo; based on this I created 
tables and charts that organized the information and helped me draw conclusions, which, 
in turn, helped me seize upon the actionable option of developing a new entity: 
AgroEstacion. I presented the results in chronological order in a diary format, telling the 
story of each of the problem-solving cycle’s eight phases. According to Miles, 
Huberman, and Saldaña, “Display is an organized, compressed assembly of information 
that allows conclusion drawing and action.” (p. 12) My data collection display includes 
tables, graphs, and flow charts that serve as a visual tool to help me both identify and 
explain the details in the dissertation’s results section. This part of the data analysis 
process was crucial to helping me draw conclusions about the project.  
Conclusion drawing. According to Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña, conclusions 
include noted patterns, explanations, causal flows, and propositions (M. B. Miles et al., 
2013). The authors underscore the importance of holding these conclusions lightly and 
maintaining skepticism; the goal in so doing is to be a competent researcher. Also, it is 
 68 
vital to develop conclusions in a continuous manner, because some conclusions may not 
appear until after the data collection process is complete (Figure 9). 
Thus, I have been drawing conclusions since the end of the first stage of action 
research (which produced AgroEstacion) and throughout the second stage, when I began 
to analyze the outcome, challenges, and actions taken by the project participants. I 
stopped collecting data in the second week of December 2015 and began finalizing the 
empirical analysis and conclusions at that time. 
Table 11 Code domain table 
Domain Location Definitions References 
Resource  • Firm Network 
• The set of firm and upstream 
resources that can be activated in 
the value co-creation process. 
These resources can be physical, 
knowledge, and/or 
organizational. 
• Physical: Tangible assets, 
complementary assets, financial 
assets, and market and structural 
assets, including warehouses, 
logistic equipment, IT 
equipment, and capital.  
• Knowledge: Know-how, abilities, 
routines, processes, procedures, 
and tacit and explicit knowledge 
that is not easily duplicable and 
imitable; examples include 38 
years’ industry and market 
experience, and business and 
commercial processes.  
• Organizational: Formal and 
informal structures and processes 
to delegate authority and 
responsibility for asset 
allocation; examples include 
employee, supplier, financial, 
and customer networks. 
• (Barney, 
Wright, & 
Ketchen, 
2001; Cazares 
et al., 2015; 
Hernandez et 
al., 2014; 
Tashman & 
Marano, 2009; 
David J. Teece 
et al., 1997) 
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• BOP Network 
• The set of physical, knowledge, 
and organizational resources 
(described above) available to 
the BOP distributors and farmers 
that can be activated in the value 
co-creation process.  
Option 
• Available options 
(AVO) 
• Actionable options 
(ACO) 
• Realized option 
(REO) 
• AVO: A capability investment 
opportunity in the option bundle 
that awaits recognition. 
• ACO: A capability investment 
that has been examined and 
found to be both desirable and 
feasible. 
• REO: A capability investment 
that has already been made. 
• (Bowman 
& Hurry, 
1993; 
Bowman & 
Moskowitz, 
2001; Timothy 
A Luehrman, 
1998; 
Sandberg et 
al., 2014) 
Value  
co-
creation 
 
• Activities, collaboration, and 
arrangements through which the 
firm and BOP network co-create 
value. 
• (Calton et 
al., 2013; 
Cazares et al., 
2015; 
Hernandez et 
al., 2014) 
Phases 
• Committing to 
BOP strategizing 
• Identifying 
available options 
• Developing 
actionable options 
• Crafting 
AgroEstacion 
• Strategizing 
process options 
• Engaging 
franchisees 
• Networking for 
expansion 
• The process concerned with 
understanding how things evolve 
over time and why they evolve in 
the way they do; phases offer a 
means of conceptualizing events 
and detecting patterns among 
them. AgroEstacion was 
conceived, designed, and created 
through this process. 
• (Langley, 
1999; Van de 
Ven & Huber, 
1990) 
 
Source • Speaker  
• TMT: Top management team 
• BOP farmer: Farmer with a small 
(1–5 ha) extension of land  
• Local distributor: Local 
distributor from ANSA’s 
network that can be classified as 
BOP 
• Supplier: Top manager from an 
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MNC 
• Expert: From the agribusiness 
industry 
• Franchisee: Local distributor 
selected to be part of 
AgroEstacion 
• Task force team: ANSA’s middle 
managers, who were invited to 
develop AgroEstacion 
• AgroEstacion team: The task 
force team transformed into the 
AE (for AgroEstacion) 
managerial team 
• Advisor: the research advisor 
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VII CHAPTER 7: EMPERICAL ANALYSIS 
We published the preliminary results of the first stage of this action research as 
Cazares-Hernandez R., Lawson-Lartego, L., Quinonez-Romandia, S. and Mathiassen, L.: 
“Strategizing Value Co-Creation with Poor Farmers in a Mexican Agribusiness,” The 5th 
International Conference on Engaged Management Scholarship, Baltimore, Maryland, 
September 2015. However, while my presentation of results from the first four phases 
here overlaps with this earlier account, it is distinctly different based on my own 
subsequent analysis (described in Section 6).  
VII.1 Committing to BOP Strategizing 
Exploring strategic and ethical business issues within ANSA. On November 
11, 2013, our team of students from GSU’s Executive Doctorate in Business Program 
organized a first workshop with our advisor, Professor Lars Mathiassen, Ph.D., with the 
goal of developing a qualitative research project and writing an article on it. At the time, 
we were confused and undecided on important project details, including the context, the 
literature stream, and the methodology/approach to use. As we discussed the different 
challenges that firms face in diverse contexts, we found ourselves lost in a sea of theories 
and possibilities. Also, our research team had very diverse backgrounds and reference 
points: two of us were Mexicans; one was Togolese and had recently lived in the US, the 
UK, and France; and our advisor was a native of Denmark now living in the US. At some 
point, our team focused attention on one particular firm: ANSA, a Mexican agribusiness 
company in which I held a top management position. The team listened as I told the 
company’s story—from its founding through the diverse phases of its life cycle—and 
also described its business model, the industry, the market, and, most important, the 
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challenges the company had faced over time and the very pressing ones it was currently 
confronting. 
The day after this first workshop, the advisor sent us an email containing a list of 
issues to explore in studying ANSA, focusing on how the company had historically 
managed to grow and become sustainable by pragmatically maneuvering the complex 
landscape of forces in which it operates. Our research team thus aimed to document: 
• critical events that had shaped the firm’s trajectory; 
• antecedents to these developments; 
• details of the critical events and how the firm confronted them; 
• the most relevant outcomes, including growth in business, improved sustainability 
performance, and improved reputation as a firm with a corporate sustainability 
profile; and 
• the stream of literature we planned to contribute to with this work. 
In early December 2013, our research team held a second workshop. This time, 
we felt more confident and less adrift, but we still had many unanswered questions. At 
the workshop, we discussed ANSA’s history and current situation, searching for the 
opportunities to engage with the company. When our advisor mentioned “corporate 
sustainability,” we began to find some clarity. It was also in this second workshop when 
DCT was first mentioned as a theoretical framing. It sounded elegant, scientific, and 
solid, which thrilled us. The idea of the research project was taking form. Our advisor 
then laid out the next phase: “We need to develop the following: a problem setting useful 
not only for the firm, but also for the business world, and an area of concern in the 
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literature, a research question of interest for practitioners and academia, and 
contributions valuable to the problem and an area of concern.”  
As a first step, we zoomed in on five key events in ANSA’s history: 
• Mexican banks stopped providing credit to farmers, so ANSA worked with 
suppliers to provide that service 
• US markets requested “pure” berries—that is, nurtured without chemical 
pesticides—so ANSA provided requisite input 
• The CCO wanted to diversify ANSA’s suppliers to include advanced, smaller 
suppliers in addition to the few big players 
• Security issues made ANSA retract from certain market areas, while providers 
pressured ANSA to continue in those areas 
• Red-yellow tax brackets—that is, new taxes for agrichemicals calculated by the 
toxicity of the pesticide—forced ANSA to rethink its product portfolio 
A third workshop took place at GSU at the end of January 2014. In this workshop, 
our research team explored the possibility of focusing its investigation on the BOP 
context because ANSA was embedded in the BOP market, and one of our researchers had 
extensive knowledge about the subject from working with CARE, an NGO. The research 
team wanted to explore the possibilities for ANSA to grow in the BOP context. Once 
again, we focused on DCT, and on a paper by Thasman and Marano (2009) in particular. 
All of our team members agreed that the firm had interesting opportunities for exploiting 
its dynamic capabilities in the BOP corn farmers segment in Mexico, especially given the 
considerable percentage of BOP farmers in some existing ANSA locations.  
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In the second week of January 2014, the research team decided to develop an 
action research with ANSA, using DCT to explore and engage with the BOP corn 
farmers market. 
Conducting a workshop with ANSA executives. Later that spring, the research 
team organized a two-day workshop with ANSA’s top management team (TMT) at GSU. 
The TMT consisted of four experienced people who knew the market, the industry, and 
the country; two of them began their careers working in MNCs and two had been 
working at ANSA for more than 20 years. The participants were: 
• The firm’s president is a 69-year-old self-made man. His first experiences in 
farming were in high school, when he spent his summers in California working in 
the fields with his uncle and cousins, picking vegetables and plowing the land for 
American farmers. He eventually graduated from a Mexican Agricultural College 
located in the state of Sonora, earning a degree in agronomy. Initially, he worked 
for an MNC; at 31, he became the youngest CCO in Mexico at that time. After 
being dismissed from the MNC, he moved with his young family to 
Guadalajara—Mexico’s second largest city—and founded ANSA. 
• The CEO is a 60-year-old agronomist from northern Mexico. He is well known in 
the industry as extremely loyal to the company and to the suppliers. He attended 
one of the top universities in Mexico and worked for one of the most important 
ANSA suppliers. He was the first to arrive every day at the office and for many 
years was the last one to leave at night. The customers, suppliers, and employees 
respected and loved him.  
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• The CCO is a 41-year-old agronomist and the second son of the company’s 
founder. He was well known by the suppliers, had an excellent knowledge of the 
markets, and was strongly engaged in managing sales and discussing ANSA’s 
strategies. 
• The CBO is a 43-year-old business major with an MBA; he is the oldest son of 
the company’s founder and author of this dissertation. 
The research team had three objectives for the workshop. The first was to create 
trust and agree on collaboration between the research team and the TMT. The second was 
to develop an understanding of the firm’s background: its history, business model, key 
financials, future plans, and challenges and opportunities. The third objective was to 
present a research proposal for consideration by the TMT, including the material on the 
BOP, DCT, and successful BOP business cases. 
Creating initial trust took some effort. The guests appeared uncomfortable and 
had several questions related to a possible research collaboration. Early on, the CCO 
asked: “I would like to know why we are here?” To the non-Mexican members of the 
research team, that question sounded quite aggressive and created an anxious moment. 
However, the advisor took the lead, and started to present the researcher’s background, as 
well as the practical validity of the proposed action research. Gradually, the TMT relaxed 
and started to joke around and engage with the subject of the meeting. Expressing a 
general TMT concern, the CCO said that “the Mexican agribusiness context is quite 
different from the rest of the world, specifically the USA, and I am worried that we intend 
to implement strategies designed in the USA that will not work for sure in Mexico.” The 
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research team members then explained that the workshop had multiple objectives, and 
one very important one was to learn about ANSA’s specific situation from the TMT. 
Discussing ANSA’s history and its current situation, challenges, and sensing 
opportunities. The workshop allowed the research team to learn about ANSA’s history 
as well as its current challenges and opportunities. ANSA was founded in 1977; one of 
the main resources it developed over time was an extensive network of distributors—
more than 1,250 at the time this project began. Some of these local distributors had also 
developed over time, growing from small stores to strong local distributors with 
cultivated networks of physical, knowledge, and organizational resources. It was this 
growth among suppliers that had begun attracting the interest of MNCs. ANSA had 
survived many of its competitors due to its specific capabilities, the development of 
resources that strengthened its position in the industry, and (of course) a bit of luck. Still, 
the business context was rapidly changing, and it became clear that ANSA needed to 
adapt.  
“We are lucky to work with something we love,” declared the President, “we work daily 
from roosters to crickets” (that is, from dawn until dusk). But, as the CCO succinctly 
expressed it, “we cannot keep doing business as usual.”  
One threat that the TMT pointed out was that the MNCs, driven by pressures from 
their headquarters, began to look downstream to local distributors—ANSA’s direct 
customers—to make them direct distributors for the MNCs. This scenario had played out 
once before  in 2000, when a key supplier from one of ANSA’s subsidiaries canceled its 
contract and opened new distributors in the central and southern states of Mexico, 
threatening ANSA’s survival. Still, ANSA’s relationship with MNCs is important. For 
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example, in 2014, Dow Agrosciences—a subsidiary of Dow Chemical, and one of the 
main players in the agrichemical industry worldwide—had global sales of $7.3 billion 
worldwide and $96 million in Mexico; that same year, ANSA represented 25% of Dow’s 
sales in Mexico, and Dow’s products represented 32% of ANSA sales.  
The TMT was worried about ANSA’s position with suppliers. The President said: 
“We are worried that our big suppliers (MNCs) are thinking about how to obtain the 
knowledge and information we learned from the market; the only strategy we have right 
now is to diversify suppliers—something they don’t like very much.” Considering this 
challenge, the TMT emphasized that ANSA is a people’s firm—that is, one of its key 
organizational resources derived from its dynamic capabilities and firm network is the 
way in which it has co-existed and moved forward with its people, supporting the 
professional development of its employees and retaining them for a long time. As the 
CCO expressed with pride, “We have three or four employees that are second or third 
generation, and some of them climbed in our hierarchy—for example, some sons of our 
old trucks drivers went to college, got their engineering degree, and now they are 
working at the firm as agronomists.” One of ANSA’s long-time priorities has been to 
maintain and develop its organizational resources—specifically, its human asset 
retention—by encouraging loyalty and supporting staff members in personal 
development, such as providing scholarships and company time for them to pursue 
academic degrees. This is noteworthy; ANSA is based in Mexico, a country in which the 
culture of retirement—that is, working for a single firm until retirement—is uncommon 
in the private sector. At ANSA, however, three employees have already retired after 
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many years of working there and several other people have been at ANSA for more than 
30 years. 
Hence, one of ANSA’s strengths is its knowledge resources, based on its 
operating in the industry for many years and representing a barrier for other players to 
enter the competition. Moreover, in 2009, as many companies in Mexico and 
internationally were going bankrupt, ANSA did well in large part because of its location 
in the agribusiness sector. As the President put it, “People need to keep eating, it’s that 
simple.” Further, ANSA’s presence in the market filled the void as other players left the 
sector. In particular, the CEO emphasized the absence of financial support from private 
banks for agribusiness: “ANSA is providing financial support to the farmers and local 
distributors, taking the role of a bank, with some risks and rewards.” The CCO also 
emphasized ANSA’s activity managing MNCs’ assets—transferring their inventory and 
their technology to farmers—which MNCs cannot do given the market’s size and 
geographic dispersion: “Our relationship with our suppliers is as important as the one 
we have with our clients.”  
Discussing the BOP proposition and cases. “More than half of the world is 
poor,” said our advisor, “and we cannot expect the governments or the Bill Gates’ of the 
world to solve this issue. It must be resolved through businesses—large, medium, and 
small ones—participating in the BOP segment, doing business, and making money in this 
process, contributing to poverty reduction. This is what we want to propose to ANSA, to 
expand its business by doing more with poor farmers.” The research team thus presented 
to the TMT successful cases of companies engaging with the BOP so that the TMT could 
reflect on the possibility of orienting ANSA’s strategy to include BOP engagement. From 
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Africa to Mexico, the cases were diverse and drawn from various industries and markets. 
“I think we are already serving the BOP,” said the CCO. Although our research team 
agreed with this statement, we argued that ANSA lacked a defined strategy for this 
market, despite having considerable data and knowledge that related to the BOP 
proposition in the firm’s context. Engaging with the BOP in a strategic way represented a 
great opportunity for the firm, both in expanding to engage further with poor farmers and 
in actually producing more food. The TMT agreed that, while ANSA was participating in 
the BOP segment, its doing so was heavily dependent on a BOP network, with local 
distributors as middlemen. From there, ideas began to take shape, including the CEO’s 
suggestion that ANSA could “provide hybrid seeds on loan to farmers and recoup the 
debt after the harvest.”  
Summary. In this first phase, the TMT and the research team engaged in 
exploring possible BOP strategies; understanding the ANSA network’s physical, 
knowledge, and organizational resources; and brainstorming available options. This 
phase also gave the research team requisite knowledge of ANSA and its context, 
industry, and market. This essential knowledge created the basis for developing a detailed 
research design and a collaboration agreement with ANSA. Table 12 summarizes these 
key findings.  
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Table 12 Summary of Committing to BOP Strategizing 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• 38 years’ experience as a 
leading distributor of 
agrichemicals (knowledge) 
• Logistics know-how 
anchored in a network of 
2,650 customers, including 
1,300 distributors 
(organizational & physical) 
• Logistics equipment and 22 
warehouses (organizational 
& physical) 
• Experienced employees, 
including agronomists, 
managers, administrators, 
and operators with long-
term ANSA relationships 
(organizational) 
• Strong relations with the 
main suppliers (MNCs) 
(organizational) 
• Previous experience as a 
financing substitute for 
distributors and farmers 
(physical)  
• Flat operation 
(organizational) 
• Direct contact 
with BOP 
farmers 
(organizational) 
• Knowledge of 
the market 
(knowledge) 
• Search for a 
strategy to 
reach farmers 
directly 
• Explore the 
BOP market 
to understand 
its 
possibilities  
• Become a 
financial 
supplier to the 
farming 
business 
• Capitalize 
knowledge  
• Distribute 
more directly 
to BOP 
farmers 
• Exploit the 
logistics 
capability 
• Focus on 
markets for 
corn, 
sorghum, and 
vegetables 
• Discuss 
ANSA’s  
opportunities 
for value co-
creation with 
BOP farmers 
• Research cases 
of value co-
creation in 
other industries 
• Review 
ANSA’s history 
as a basis for 
value co-
creation 
VII.2 Identifying Available Options 
The two-day workshop with the TMT helped our research team begin to generate 
preliminary ideas about the firm’s available options. This propelled the launch of the 
second phase: sensing available options. The research team met every two weeks via 
Skype to discuss progress in researching and sensing available options.  
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In early May 2014, the research team agreed on ANSA’s biggest challenge: 
several ANSA suppliers—who were traditionally the firm’s allies—intended to shorten 
the supply chain and go directly to local distributors, threatening the firm’s continuity and 
market presence. “Ants are becoming elephants,” said the CBO, “When one of our local 
distributors starts to compete against us and an MNC starts to work with him, we get 
angry, we get mad, but our reaction should be to concentrate on opening a new local 
distributor or strengthen a small one in the same region.”  
Another challenge was the credit line ANSA gave to its clients, one of the firm’s 
physical resources. Due to specific financial internal policies, ANSA limited the amount 
of credit a distributor could access. Increasing the terms, time, or amount of credit 
required the distributor to present collateral. However, many distributors could not afford 
this additional collateral, so they faced a lack of inventory in the crucial phase of the 
cropping season. A third challenge was the limitations that BOP farmers faced in terms of 
credit, cash, and collateral, which capped their ability to improve their productivity. As 
the CCO expressed during the workshop: “The BOP market is a difficult and risky one, 
surrounded with huge uncertainty.” In a way, as described above, ANSA was already 
participating in the BOP markets, but it was doing so without a planned or deliberate 
strategy. 
During the research team meetings, we summarized our nine preliminary ideas 
into six available options: 
• Option 1: Develop a joint venture (JV) with one of the MNCs suppliers who 
shared a strategic interest in shortening the supply chain between market 
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segments  
• Option 2: Develop a catalog of specific products (a technological package) 
designed for the BOP farmers. Given the limited size of the land owned by BOP 
farmers, the specific technology packages designed for medium and large 
farmers are not accessible. Creating this new, smaller technological package 
would require an understanding of the BOP farmer’s purchasing capacity 
• Option 3: Identify strategies for engaging BOP farmers. This would require 
ANSA to search for the right strategies to increase demand for and awareness of 
products and services for this market segment. It would also require introspective 
exercises to understand which products and services—including financial 
services and mechanical equipment—ANSA could provide to increase the 
productivity of the BOP farmers 
• Option 4: Develop tools for BOP self-organization, such as information centers, 
workshops, and knowledge-sharing meetings. Given the large number of BOP 
farmers in the country, ANSA could search for different forms of collectives, 
depending on local farmers’ aspirations and needs 
• Option 5: Help distributors target BOP farmers. ANSA’s local distributors are 
mainly small and medium-sized businesses; some could be categorized as “mom 
and pop” stores. Of ANSA’s 1,350 distributors, 75% lack strategic plans and 
management capabilities. The firm could exploit these established businesses—
providing them with training and IT support—through its well-established team 
of managers. Other training topics might include marketing and sales techniques, 
HR management, and accounting and finance 
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• Option 6: Develop a franchise model for the BOP farming market. This franchise 
model could be constructed in an alliance between the firm and selected 
distributors to create a branded distribution platform with the principal objective 
of serving the BOP farmers 
Summary. This second phase allowed our research team to analyze initial data 
about ANSA and its suppliers, distributors, and markets. Our focus was on identifying 
available options for strategizing value co-creation with the BOP. As such, research team 
members discussed the firm’s network resources, identified preliminary BOP network 
resources, and discussed preliminary ideas on value co-creation. Table 13 presents the 
findings from the second phase. 
Table 13 Summary of Identifying Available Options 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Reaffirm 
initial 
knowledge 
about firm 
network 
from first 
phase 
• Reaffirm 
initial 
knowledge 
about BOP 
network 
from first 
phase 
• Develop a JV with 
one of the MNCs 
• Develop a catalog 
of specific services 
and products for the 
BOP farmers 
• Identify strategies 
for engaging BOP 
farmers 
• Develop tools for 
BOP self-
organization 
• Help distributors 
target BOP farmers 
• Develop a franchise 
model for the BOP 
market 
• Investigate options for co-
creating value with MNCs 
• Develop options for targeting 
BOP market and explore of 
possible solutions 
• Increasing sales and access to 
technology for the BOP farmers 
• Establish a firm presence in the 
minds of BOP farmers, offering 
information that can increase 
their negotiating power  
• Create a strong tie between the 
firm and local distributors with 
benefits for both 
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VII.3 Interacting with ANSA and the BOP Network 
In the summer of 2014, the two of us who spoke Spanish began another phase of 
our team’s data collection efforts in the western region of Mexico. 
Collect data and sense-analyze/dilute options. In the second week of July, we 
visited Cihuatlan Jalisco, a small farming town of approximately 30,000 people 
occupying less than 443 square miles of land five miles from the Pacific Ocean. The main 
economic activity in Cihuatlan is agriculture—primarily cattle ranching and crop 
production (mainly vegetables, including corn, and fruit such as mango, banana, and 
papaya). Some farmers own big plots of land, but there are also small BOP farmers. We 
interviewed nine farmers with the objective of gathering data about the BOP farmers’ 
reality and their conditions, using the six absence-dimensions of the asset hexagon as a 
guide.  The data obtained from this first cycle of interviews showed that statements made 
at the TMT workshop in Atlanta were accurate: BOP farmers faced a lack of agriculture 
inputs, including credit and tools (such as machinery and irrigation materials). A papaya 
farmer who owned 3 hectares of land (7.4 acres), explained: “We have an absence of 
financial help in this business, especially to start the crop season, the beginning of the 
farming: soil preparation, manpower, and labor. The credit only comes from suppliers 
like ANSA, but manpower requires 60% of our cost of production,” When we asked the 
BOP farmers to prioritize their issues from more important to less, the top priority was 
both unexpected and posed in the form of a question: “Who is going to buy my crop?” 
One of the farmers elaborated: “What we really need is the certainty that our crops are 
going to be bought and paid. After harvest, our crops end up in the hands of the ‘coyotes’ 
[the Mexican nickname for middlemen who take advantage of farmers] and they always 
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take a long time to pay us.” Said another farmer: “We have the will to pay our suppliers 
as soon as possible; we want to be on good terms with them … Do you think there is a 
possibility that I could pay the supplier debt with part of my crop? That would help me a 
lot.” As these comments and others showed, the main concern for the BOP farmers in 
this region was the absence of a secure commercialization channel for their products.  
After two days, we traveled to a different region in western Mexico. On the first 
day, we visited “Los Altos de Jalisco” (Jalisco’s Highlands) a region located 120 miles 
from Guadalajara City, to interview three local distributors. Los Altos consists of a group 
of 21 small and medium-sized urban areas within 9,300 square miles and divided in two 
regions: north and south. The area’s main economic activity is agriculture, including 
cattle, pig, and poultry operations; dairy production; agave planting; tequila production; 
and corn farming. Our team’s objective was to validate the commercializing channel 
issue expressed by the farmers from Cihuatlan, by interviewing two local distributors. 
This region is different from Cihuatlan in terms of weather, crops, and the farming cycle. 
However, the conclusions about BOP farming concerns were similar. As the distributor 
we interviewed in Tepatitlan town put it: “My clients have a lack of cash flow, self-
organization, and information.” Local distributors needed a reliable market for the 
harvest—which was also the main issue affecting BOP farmers. This point was 
underlined by a second distributor we interviewed in Zapotlanejo town: “My customers 
prefer to buy products (pesticides, fertilizers, and seeds) from the coyotes who sell those 
products at very high prices, but accept harvest as payment.”   
Two important facts were confirmed in this round of interviews. First, farmers 
trust their local distributor; they ask distributors for advice and believe their 
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recommendations. This confirms the power of influence that local distributors have over 
the decision-making process, which is a key organizational resource. Second, although 
funds are available, small BOP farmers do not benefit from government programs 
because they do not know how to access them.  
We next traveled to Ayotitlan (see Illustration 1), a small town with a population 
of 620 in the south hills. Although this area is only 60 miles from Guadalajara, it still 
takes almost two hours to get to the local distributor store. In Ayotitlan, we interviewed a 
very energetic woman, who was the area’s distributor, and her husband, who was a 
farmer. The woman and her three daughters managed the store without any technical or 
professional background. The region’s farmers could, in every respect, be considered 
BOP farmers: they owned 3 hectares of property or less, had no mechanical equipment, 
and the amount of corn they produced forced them to rely on the coyotes. 
The data we received this time was not surprising; the issues and terms were 
similar to those we heard about in the previous towns: “The farmers in this area need 
urgent credit and training,” said the woman, adding that “they trust us as distributors, 
and are open to our advice.” She also reaffirmed the local distributor’s influence with 
BOP farmers as an organizational resource. She was an extremely committed leader in 
her community and showed honest concern for the wealth of the farmers: “I’m trying to 
improve their well-being—teaching them to buy insurance every crop season and to sign 
a Contract Farming Agreement so we can help them to sell their harvest.” A Contract 
Farming Agreement (CFA) is a contract the farmers sign in partnership with a 
middleman—in this case, a middle-woman—and a big buyer in the food industry that 
needs corn as a raw material (examples include vegetable oil companies, food processors, 
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meat processors, flour processors, and big farming companies that sell poultry or eggs). 
Our interview with this distributor again confirmed a lack of equipment and technology 
among the BOP farmers, adding to a lack of credit and training.   
Conduct workshops with Task force and customers. Early in August, my 
Spanish-speaking colleague and I reunited with ANSA’s department managers at the 
firm’s headquarters. We invited managers whose main activities were related to or had 
contact with customers, farmers, and distributors. The participants were: 
• the acquisitions manager 
• Guadalajara’s business unit manager 
• the inventory manager 
• the operations manager 
• the credit analysis manager 
• the internal auditor 
• the comptroller 
• the central warehouse manager, and 
• the bill collection manager 
We first explained to the managers the discussion’s objectives by presenting the 
research and its goals. It was important that we listen to this group of professionals, 
because they had worked for many years in the firm and interacted daily with the farmers 
and local distributors. We let the managers speak freely and mediated the discussion 
based on the points already discussed with the distributors and the BOP farmers. We 
learned that credit problems were not just related to absence of cash, but also to ignorance 
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of how to apply for financial support. The Acquisitions Department manager shared her 
experience in dealing with the BOP segment: “Some years ago, we discovered that, at 
that time, all the distribution companies in the central states of Mexico were fighting to 
get one client that used to be the biggest in that area. And, after a research was made by 
a sales rep, we discovered that there were a lot of small businesses and small farmers 
unattended by the market, because everyone wanted to have the big customer.” That 
sales rep, she said, had gone from ranch to ranch, visiting with those small farmers.  
 
Illustration 1 Ayotitlan Jalisco 
An important outcome of the data we gathered in that meeting was the realization 
that most local distributors were weak in their knowledge of administration, credit 
policies, inventory management, and accounting strategies. These disadvantages pushed 
many local distributors into administrative chaos. The comptroller and the credit analyst 
shared the experience of helping some of ANSA’s local distributors when they faced 
fiscal problems or billing collection issues. “In the Billing Collection Department, we 
advise the client how they can pay their bills, giving them the best options to pay their 
debts. We also advise the clients to not buy too much inventory—something the people in 
the Sales Department don’t like very much.” 
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In early August 2014, we held a meeting with one of the top executives of a 
European MNC that was one of ANSA’s suppliers. “It’s a relief for me that we’re having 
this conversation, because in our company, we are very concerned about ANSA’s future. 
We are convinced that ANSA has important strengths, but there are some challenges to 
which we don’t see any action taken by ANSA,” said the executive. “One of the strengths 
ANSA has is its people, the sale force, and the technical support this team provides to the 
market, especially to the distribution channel. But this distribution channel is also a 
disadvantage, because the farmer sees more of the local distributor than ANSA.” The 
executive called this an eclipse effect. He pointed out that ANSA is a distributor that 
develops and promotes products, and that other types of distributors exist that do not 
contribute to the market, but rather offer only logistical functions. When asked about his 
company’s position on creating a JV with ANSA, he said that his company “does not 
have this kind of strategy in the short, medium, or long term, because in Mexico we don’t 
have knowledge about any successful case of a JV between a supplier and a distributor. 
As we know, this strategy showed poor improvements and more problems for both parties 
in the past.” This statement began to change our actionable option list. Further, in 
addition to what the previous interviews provided, the executive mentioned the three 
main challenges for the BOP farmers, but in inverse order; this showed us that the MNCs 
did not have accurate data regarding the BOP market segment. As the first problem, the 
executive cited training in technology use; second, access to credit for seeds and 
products; and third, the commercialization of their crops. The executive finished with a 
key statement: “ANSA needs to make a strategic decision about what it is going to do in 
the future, which road it is going to take. Is it going to be a supplier of crop protection 
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products or is it going to go downstream to develop products and participate in the 
market directly with the farmers?” 
That same day, our team met with a second top executive from an MNC based in 
the US that was also an ANSA supplier. This executive held an important position, and 
had access to data from the industry and the market; also, he had known ANSA for more 
than 30 years. The meeting took place at the executive’s office. “ANSA is very 
important,” he said. “In general, the distributor covers a priority—that is, the risk of 
operating retail sales. The second important part that justifies the distributor’s existence 
is the creation of demand—that’s the job of the distributor. When the distributor does not 
create this demand, that’s when we the suppliers opt for going directly to the market.” 
The executive had similar opinions as his counterpart. This company’s strategy for 
growing in the market was less aggressive and sustained not in terms of loyalty but due to 
its hard credit policy for new customers. This executive believed that changes were 
needed in the distributor structure, and that the BOP strategy sounded like the right one to 
follow: “We, as suppliers, cannot reach the BOP farmers. There are so many, they are so 
widespread.” The JV strategy option lost weight in this interview as well. The executive 
told our research team that his company’s stand on this strategy was not positive as it had 
done JVs with distributors in the past, and in Mexico and Central and South America 
those ventures had ended in failure. The research team asked him his opinion about 
ANSA collecting grain from the farmers as payment, and he agreed strongly on this 
point: “We had suggested to ANSA in the past to receive grain. When you become the 
recipient of the grain, the farmer will trust you and be more open to the advice you give 
to him.” 
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Interact and discuss with executive team. After the interviews with the 
suppliers, our research team sat down with the TMT to discuss the preliminary findings. 
While preserving the anonymity of the interviewees, we provided an overview of the key 
findings. The firm’s President and the CEO were surprised about these preliminary 
findings, including the comments, opinions, and the near- and long-term plans for 
moving ANSA forward in the industry. Initially, the TMT members were in denial about 
this information, but at the end of the meeting, the TMT agreed to be more open to the 
idea that a new strategy was needed. 
Summary.  In this phase, the JV actionable option was discarded after we learned 
of the suppliers’ position and their past experiences with this type of venture. However, 
almost all interviewees agreed on one thing: ANSA needed to become involved in the 
commercialization of the harvest in some way. Everything suggested that ANSA should 
focus its effort downstream, on the BOP network and the resources owned by its 
members. In this phase, our research team identified the BOP network’s resources and 
seized on a downstream strategy as the firm’s best option. We identified the local 
distributor’s potential to develop access to the BOP market in this phase, allowing the 
firm to develop a strategy supporting these resources. Finally, the franchise model was 
decided on as the most appropriate option.  Table 14 summarizes these results. 
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Table 14 Summary of Interacting with Firm and BOP Network 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Capacity to supply 
credit to small farmers 
(physical) 
• Training capacity to 
develop local 
distributors 
(organizational & 
knowledge) 
• Personnel with 
technical knowledge 
to support local 
distributors and 
farmers 
(organizational) 
• Creator of demand for 
the MNC (knowledge 
& organizational) 
• Good image upstream 
and downstream 
• Power of influence 
with the farmers 
• Middleman 
function 
(organizational) 
• Knowledge about 
the market 
(knowledge) 
• Top-of-mind 
leadership with the 
BOP farmer 
(organizational) 
• Family-business 
(organizational) 
 
• Develop a 
downstream 
strategy through 
local distributors 
to exploit their 
power of 
influence 
• Identify 
strategies for 
engaging with 
BOP farmers and 
local distributors 
• Develop a 
strategy for 
helping 
distributors 
targeting BOP 
farmers 
• Develop a 
franchise model  
• Understand options 
for co-creating value 
with local 
distributors 
• Develop the quality 
of local distributors’ 
operations  
• Increase BOP farmer 
productivity by 
collecting their 
crops, thus 
strengthening the 
relation between 
ANSA, local 
distributors, and 
BOP farmers  
• Create strong ties 
between ANSA and 
distributors through 
crossing-knowledge  
VII.4 Developing Actionable Options 
Conduct workshops with research team, executive team and task force. At 
the end of August 2014, we held a second workshop with the TMT at ANSA’s 
headquarters. Our research team members from Atlanta participated face-to-face with 
managers and the TMT at ANSA. The objectives for this second workshop were to dilute 
the options and seize on five that were actionable, then decide which would be part of the 
implemented business model. We first offered a summary of the outcomes from the 
interviews and the focus group, and then we presented the Integrated Model of BOP 
strategizing (described in Section 4.3) on a whiteboard to explain how ANSA would 
collaborate with the BOP network for value co-creation (Figure 7).  
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The TMT and our researcher team concluded that ANSA’s efforts should focus on 
an adapted franchise model that would combine the actionable options. This option 
would support ANSA’s needed expansion and help address its weakness by developing a 
close collaboration directly with BOP farmers. It would positively improve supplier 
perception of ANSA through a strategy that would both move the firm closer to the final 
users of products and fill the void of knowledge in the BOP network about the corn 
commercialization business. Overall, it would also strengthen ANSA in its position 
versus competitors. 
On the second day of the workshop, we recommended creating a task force of 
managers from ANSA’s administrative and commercial departments. Their participation 
and professional expertise and background could add value to the project under the 
CBO’s leadership. The task force had four objectives: 
• Understand the franchise business model’s regulations and legal concepts in 
Mexico. 
• Design the franchise’s service and product portfolio and the administrative and 
commercial processes as the main components of the business model. 
• Design the organization structure for this entity. 
• Create the brand, symbols, mission, vision, and motto. 
Develop/seize actionable options. In early September 2014, the selected 
departmental managers were invited to meet with two members of our research team at 
ANSA’s headquarters. There, we presented the project’s antecedents, the main findings 
of the data collection, and the preliminary conclusions of the strategizing process. We 
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also informed the managers about the creation of the task force. The managers were 
enthusiastic about the project, and confirmed their full commitment to working with the 
research team in the objectives cited above. We informed the task force that the 
timeframe was short, but they were optimistic; as the credit manager declared: “Time is 
short, but we can do it.” Later that day, a law firm was invited to work on the legal 
matters to involved in creating the new franchise company, as well as to provide advice 
on how ANSA could engage with the local distributors. The legal team also advised 
ANSA on how it might later detach the franchisee from the company. The law firm was 
in charge of designing the new entity’s legal structure and the contracts required to 
regulate its operation. It also offered advice about the taxation situation between the 
franchise and franchisees. 
In late September, I used participant observation to begin documenting and 
recording the task force’s efforts to implement the new strategy based on the Integrated 
Model of BOP strategizing (Figure 7). The task force presented a list of possible brand 
names for the new company, aiming to choose one that would describe the full spectrum 
of products and services. From an extensive list, the group selected AgroEstacion as it 
reflected a set of key meanings; in Spanish, “Estación” means both “station” and 
“season”: 
• AgroEstacion: As a season for agricultural activities 
• AgroEstacion: As a station—that is, a point or site of frequent stopping in a 
transportation chain (as in a train station) 
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• AgroEstacion: As a station in the sense of a building or site at which specific 
services are offered—in this case, a one-stop location where farmers can find all 
the agro supplies they need 
The essential function of AgroEstacion was to allow ANSA to engage the BOP 
network, to provide better services and products to BOP farmers, and to help BOP 
farmers develop into better crop producers.  As we argued in our previous paper: “This 
process would assure the principle of social and economic promotion of the agents of the 
BOP network based on the dynamic capabilities of both firm network and BOP network” 
(Cazares-Hernandez, et. al, p. 18).  
Due to Mexico’s 2014 taxation law imposed on the agribusiness industry’s use of 
pesticide products, the task force had to implement a business model that would avoid 
double taxation by inserting a new stakeholder between ANSA and the local distributor. 
Hence, the task force decided to create AgroEstacion as a business platform, with three 
key operational activities: 
• Coordinate acquisition of products and service for each franchisee from ANSA 
and other suppliers. 
• Offer support services, including IT, logistics, marketing, human resources, 
government lobbying, legal procedures, store management, credit coordination 
and billing supervision, and accounting control. 
• Offer development services, including market linkages, financing, knowledge 
management, and the development of new lines of business. 
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Through these operational activities, AgroEstacion would participate in the 
growth of franchisees and control of their assets, and help franchisees gain access to 
financial services. Such support would thus help the franchisees increase their working 
capital and knowledge and gain faster access to new technologies. Figure 10 explains 
AgroEstacion’s business model. 
 
Figure 10 AgroEstacion business model 
In the first week of December 2014, our researchers and the task force conducted 
a second interview with one of the local distributors we’d visited previously during data 
collection. The purpose was to do a follow-up and to get her input on and level of interest 
in the AgroEstacion business model. The CBO conducted the presentation, explaining the 
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preliminary ideas and showing her the logos and the artist’s conception of what a 
franchise store might look like. At the end of the presentation, the distributor’s response 
was quick and strong: “Where we do sign?” The task force said there was plenty of work 
to be done, but, at this point, it was most interested in her feedback on what might 
improve the project. She pointed out that a key idea here was for franchisees to feel that 
they have backup through a partnership with a company as big as ANSA: “As a business 
person and entrepreneur, what holds you down is ignorance—not knowing how to put 
things in motion… the support of a company such as ANSA will help us to move forward 
and faster.” The CBO explained that this kind of partnership could tie her up and limit 
her decisions as well; she would not have the same freedom due to the necessity of 
following certain procedures. She agreed, but said it would be acceptable because: “We 
trust that you know what is best for us.” ANSA’s CEO, who also participated in the 
meeting, explained that the benefits from this type of partnership went both ways, 
because ANSA had knowledge on how to operate a business, and the local distributors 
had knowledge about the market. 
Conduct workshops with ANSA executives. Our research team also held a third 
two-day workshop with the AgroEstacion task force and the TMT at ANSA’s 
headquarters in early December. In this workshop, we discussed recent outcomes and 
refined the plan for the new entity, reaching four key conclusions guided by a statement 
from the firm’s President: “We should be careful to not offer something we don’t know 
about; we should focus on what we are experts in.” 
Those four conclusions were as follows: 
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• We would simplify the model and reduce the services the franchisees would offer 
to the BOP farmers, focusing on a simple portfolio: credit, agrichemicals, 
fertilizers, seeds, technical support, and brokerage of their harvest 
• ANSA would invite as franchisees only those local distributors who could be 
considered BOP and had experience in financing BOP farmers and brokering their 
harvest 
• The legal agreement for this engagement would be a Partnership Business 
Agreement (PBA) 
• We chose the final logo for AgroEstacion (see Illustration 2) 
Our research team and the task force also had a meeting that same day with an 
industry expert who owned a firm similar to ANSA, but located in a north state of 
Mexico. The meeting had two objectives: to record his comments, opinions, and 
suggestions regarding AgroEstacion; and to explore the possibility of him enrolling in 
AgroEstacion through a JV. The second objective followed our strategizing model 
(Figure 7) based on the knowledge that his firm owned specific resources and also owned 
a BOP network located in regions where ANSA had no coverage. This kind of alliance 
could accelerate AgroEstacion’s development in different areas with BOP farmers—
specifically, in states in the Gulf of Mexico area. Further, his feedback was valuable 
because he had spent his entire life in the industry and knew the main stakeholders and 
the structure of the market. The industry expert found our project attractive and said it 
had high potential for success; however, he rejected the invitation to explore a JV saying 
that, for the moment, his firm had other projects in development.  
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Select/reconfigure major option (micro-franchising). In mid December 2014, 
the task force and the TMT met to follow-up on the plan and answer the doubts that some 
managers had about the project. After presenting the outcomes from the previous 
meetings and workshops, the CEO said: “Now we know where we are going.” The CBO 
was also confirmed as the leader of this project. 
 
Illustration 2 AgroEstacion commercial logo 
A week later, the task force organized a day-long meeting with the law firm that 
was supervising the project’s legal aspects to draft the legal contract (the PBA) in a way 
that was clear and attractive for the partners. Next, the task force designed the 
organizational structure, aiming to make it as flat as possible. The task force decided that 
a General Manager and four department managers would lead AgroEstacion. Figure 11 
illustrates the initial structure for AgroEstacion for the periods of 2014 and 2015. 
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Figure 11 AgroEstacion organization chart 
The main responsibilities for each manager were as follows: 
• General manager: managing overall outcomes of the operation and the 
franchisees; dealing with the corn buyers (vegetable oil producers, food 
producers, etc.); negotiating with suppliers, financial providers, and governmental 
funds; growing the number of franchisees; and supervising the overall operation. 
• Accountant: handling the platform’s fiscal and internal accounting; training the 
franchisees to process the accounting information, which must be uploaded every 
month to the fiscal authorities; and preparing the tax declaration of the 
franchisees. 
• Administrative manager: managing the program and planning the acquisition of 
products and services for the franchisees and the platform; and collecting and 
organizing the documents that the franchisees collect from their farmers to 
prepare and send the contracts to the authorities for the CFA. 
• Marketing: supervising the franchisees to ensure that they follow the 
administrative and operational processes; supervising the commercial and 
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marketing processes; and monitoring each store’s operations to ensure they follow 
the procedures described in the manuals. 
• Technical advisor: an agronomist engineer responsible for overseeing the 
technical package for the crops offered by the franchisees; supervising the crops 
in partnership with each store’s owner; visiting the farmers; and planning and 
giving training seminars to the farmers. 
The task force began with the development of the operation manual for each 
department. Due to the amount of work, two additional members—the budget planner 
and the IT manager—were invited to join the team to design the financial and IT plans. In 
the first week of January 2015, the law firm presented the PBA to the CBO and the task 
force for review. Two days later, the PBA was accepted. The task force also decided to 
invite two local distributors to a preview presentation of the company to gather feedback. 
The task force presented the final logo and the final blue prints for the stores. One of the 
franchisee candidates—the energetic woman from the town of Ayotitlan—said: “I’m 
tired of asking: Where do I sign?”  
AgroEstacion was established as a new subsidiary of ANSA to work directly with 
select franchisees. Two franchisees were selected initially based on the following: 
• They could be considered BOP businesses due to a lack of key assets specified in 
the assets hexagon and their inability to grow by themselves in the short term. 
• They had deep knowledge in their areas of market, geography, crops, farmers, and 
micro-logistics. 
• They were influential with the BOP farmers in their area. 
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• They saw ANSA as an ally. 
Both franchisees were women who had been in the market for almost 10 years. 
One was established in the state of Michoacan in a town called Idaparapeo, located 30 
minutes from Morelia city and three hours from Guadalajara. The other was the woman 
in Ayotitlan town, located two hours from Guadalajara. 
Summary. This phase represented the beginning of seizing and developing the 
selected franchise business option to make it actionable. The brand name and the logo 
were selected and the task force was created. This phase also created the foundation for 
subsequent implementation of the new firm, AgroEstacion. Table 12 summarizes the key 
results. 
Table 15 Summary of Developing Actionable Options 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Reaffirm initial 
knowledge about 
the firm’s 
network from the 
first, second, and 
third phases 
• Reaffirm 
initial 
knowledge 
about the BOP 
network from 
the first, 
second, and 
third phases 
• Create the Integrated Model 
of BOP Strategizing 
• Select the franchise model 
option  
• Create the task force 
• Design AgroEstacion: the 
brand, logo, business model, 
legal structure, PBA, and 
organizational structure  
• Choose the portfolio of 
products and services: 
credit, agrichemicals, seeds, 
tech support, and crop 
brokerage 
• Design the franchisee 
profile  
• Choose two local 
distributors as franchisees  
• Explore JV with industry 
expert 
• Strengthen the 
local distributor 
by developing 
new resources, 
which will in turn 
provide better 
services and 
products to the 
BOP farmer  
• Crossing- 
knowledge 
• Encourage co-
growth through 
co-work  
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VII.5 Crafting AgroEstacion 
Transform task force into AgroEstacion team. At the end of spring 2015, 
regular activities in ANSA’s operation reduced the task force to six people: 
• The CBO of ANSA 
• The credit manager of ANSA, who was also the operational leader of the 
AgroEstacion project 
• The financial planner of ANSA 
• A credit analyst 
• The operation manager of ANSA 
• An intern (a college student majoring in agribusiness) 
ANSA’s managers supported the project with specific activities, but no longer 
played an active-operative role. The new task force invested most of its time in 
reconfiguring ANSA’s relationship with the franchisee candidates and in crafting 
AgroEstacion. 
By spring 2015, pressure was hitting ANSA’s managers and the task force due to 
both demands from local distributors and the standard dynamic at the start of the corn 
season. The AgroEstacion project was not mature enough to be fully in motion, but the 
two selected local distributors were eager to see evidence that ANSA would fully commit 
to the project. The local distributors required capital to buy fertilizers, seed, and 
agrichemicals, and they wanted to know if AgroEstacion would be available to help 
them. Aiming to cover these necessities, the task force implemented a preliminary 
program, targeted at creating certainty with the two distributors. The CBO sent the 
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following memo to the TMT, and the task force took steps accordingly: Related to the 
pressure from our two clients that were selected to be AgroEstacion members, we came 
up with the following package to help them go through the rainy season and create 
certainty about the continuity of the project: 
• We will provide two computers with software to each of them connect them to our 
server and train them in the use of the business software 
• We’ll start a training program in the administration of their stores, as if 
AgroEstacion was already functioning. They’ll receive training in the software, 
the creation of credit files, and the administration of inventory 
• We’ll follow the operation of their business via IT 
• The AgroEstacion project leader will work close to them to learn the process of 
the funds delivery to the farmers, and the process of commercialization of the 
corn, and the purchase of fertilizer 
• They will receive an extension and increase in their line of credit from ANSA 
With these five actions, the task force gave certainty to the franchisees through 
evidence that ANSA was fully committed to developing AgroEstacion. 
By the end of spring, the credit manager and operational leader of the 
AgroEstacion project sat down with the CBO and decided to make changes in ANSA’s 
administrative structure to enable the project to move forward. The CBO organized a 
meeting with the CEO and the CCO to inform them about his decision to appoint the 
current credit manager as the general manager for AgroEstacion, noting that: “He is 
young and ambitious, and this position needs someone willing to travel a lot and with 
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social skills to deal with farmers and the franchisees.” The CEO and the CCO agreed 
with the decision. The CBO and the new manager for AgroEstacion then designed a plan 
to change ANSA administrative process and reconfigure the organizational chart. The 
reconfiguration of ANSA’s business process began in May 2015 with the merger of two 
departments: 
• Credit Department (5 employees) 
• Billing Department (7 employees) 
AgroEstacion’s new general manager took with him three credit department 
employees to work full time in AgroEstacion. It took almost one month to do the merger, 
and by the first day of June 2015 AgroEstacion’s personnel were free to work full time on 
crafting the new company. 
Design AgroEstacion business franchise concept and select distributors for 
partnership. At the end of the research’s first stage, three distributors were selected to 
become AgroEstacion franchisees. However, by the time the AgroEstacion team was 
formally established, the decision was made to concentrate the project on just two 
distributors. The third, a candidate from Los Altos, did not own the BOP network 
required at that time and did not participate in or have knowledge of resources related to 
grain commercialization, which was an important resource to ensure the franchise’s 
optimal operation.  
In a summer 2015 meeting between AgroEstacion team and the law firm, a 
decision was made to keep the legal issues simple and easy to understand in order to 
motivate local distributors to engage in the process. One of the lawyers explained: “The 
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model we need to follow is to be a business platform for agribusiness and 
commercialization. It’s a Partnership Business Agreement, it is not a regular partnership 
or an incorporated company. We have been reviewing options so we do not get all tied up 
with partners that probably in the future will want to leave, and we found that a 
Partnership Business Agreement is the most adequate for this project.” A PBA was thus 
chosen as the legal instrument to specify the relationship between AgroEstacion and its 
franchisees. A PBA has the following characteristics: 
• Each signer company (AgroEstacion and the franchisee) maintains its own legal 
identity with federal, state, and local authorities. They also have the freedom to 
end the agreement after a previously established period of time (one year) 
• AgroEstacion will supply, through this agreement, the outsourcing service of 
administration (IT, purchasing services, asset administration, and HR 
administration) and accounting to the franchisee 
• AgroEstacion will supply the complete transformation—aesthetic and 
operational—of the local distributor store without cost to the franchisee 
• The agreement will be signed for five years, with renewal possible for five years 
more 
Because AgroEstacion was not yet legally constituted, ANSA began covering 
specific needs to keep the project moving. AgroEstacion’s general manager suggested the 
following: “Besides having the Partnership Business Agreement, we need to keep 
working, so ANSA will supply the equipment to the franchisees.”  
 107 
The two local distributors were located in separate states. Both were 
entrepreneurial women whose business had a family structure. One was located in the 
town of Ayotitlan, Jalisco (Illustration 1), while the second was located in Indaparapeo, 
Michoacán. The towns were 245 miles apart, and it took more than five hours to travel 
between them. This left room to grow the number of AgroEstacion stores in the future 
without having them compete against each other (Illustration 3). The first franchisee, in 
Ayotitlan, owned in her BOP network an organizational resource of 350 BOP corn 
farmers. She was well known in her area of influence; farmers trusted her, asked for 
advice, and took her recommendations. She knew the BOP farmers personally and could 
assess their reliability regarding who could receive credit and who would pay regardless 
of the harvest outcomes. She had a small store located at the base of her house near the 
center of the village, with a medium-sized warehouse to receive the corn after harvest. 
Her store had a computer, albeit with a very slow Internet connection. She was a very 
dreamy woman, frustrated by not knowing how to achieve their plans “As an 
entrepreneur you are sometimes ignorant, not knowing how to put in motion your 
projects,” she said. 
The second selected franchisee owned a small store with the same limitations and 
inadequate capacity. She has an accounting degree and two employees helping her with 
the administrative aspects. This franchisee owned a smaller BOP network, but had a 
bigger land extension. She worked with only 25 farmers, and these farmers produced 
white corn. She had nearly 10 years of experience as a middle-woman between farmers 
and corn buyers (millers).  
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A year before our research began, this distributor had planned to retired from the 
industry: “After facing all the problems trying to organize the farmers from my former 
job, I took the decision of retire, but the farmers I knew asked me not to do that, because 
they didn’t have anyone else to help them with the commercialization process.” When the 
AgroEstacion project was presented to her in December 2014, she said: “This is like the 
dream I had when I started to do this, opening my small company—to have everything in 
order, well organized. I would not mind working following a process like in 
AgroEstacion, because with this I could invest my time doing what I love: selling and 
growing the market.”  
The fees that support the AgroEstacion platform with income are structured as 
follows: 
• Franchisees will pay a fee of 7% of their annual sales to AgroEstacion 
• For the credit supplied by AgroEstacion, franchisees receive a preferential rate of 
TIIE (The interbank equilibrium interest rate in Mexico’s financial system) plus 8 
points (in 2015, the TIIE was 3.11) 
• For franchisees who do not engage in contract farming with their farmers, 
AgroEstacion platform will charge the franchisee an additional 25.00 pesos (USD 
$1.51 in 2015) per ton 
• Franchisees will receive a special credit term of 90 days per invoice from ANSA 
(regular local distributors get only 45 days) 
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Illustration 3 Distance between franchises 
Design AgroEstacion plan, including processes, models, and manuals. Figure 
11 shows the AgroEstacion business model. By August 2015, things were full in motion 
and both stores were under renovation. The business plan was designed during meetings 
between the CBO, the general manager of AgroEstacion, and the accounting manager. 
Table 16 shows how the business model reconfigures the business process, integrating 
both networks in an inform/develop process co-creating value for both networks and the 
BOP farmer. Also, the designers decided that AgroEstacion would work as a business 
platform, with a flat but knowledgeable organizational structure, to maintain low 
operation costs.  
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Table 16 AgroEstacion strategizin value co-creation 
Strategizing 
Firm Network BOP Network Value Co-creation 
Informs Develops Informs Develops Enables Triggers 
• Stronger 
distribution 
network 
• Farmers and 
market data 
• Knowledge 
• 3% 
annual 
fee 
• IT services 
• Logistics 
• Marketing 
• Human 
resources 
• The permits 
process 
• Maintenance 
• 90-day credit 
term 
• Farmers 
data access 
• Market data 
(crops, 
weather, 
local 
techniques) 
• Brand name 
• 7% annual 
fee 
• TIIE + 8 
points rate 
for credit 
• Credit 
• Products 
• Seeds 
• Advice 
• Tooling 
services 
• Brokerage 
• Wider 
and 
stronger 
presence 
in the 
market 
To exploit ANSA’s existing knowledge and organizational resources, it was 
decided that the firm’s operative manuals would be used for AgroEstacion. Credit and 
inventory management manuals were also copied for AgroEstacion. Table 17 shows the 
process manuals from ANSA and those developed specifically for AgroEstacion. The two 
main processes that gave more value for AgroEstacion in the eyes of the BOP farmer 
were the CFA process and the brokerage process. These two services were tightly related, 
as the first (CFA) is needed to facilitate the second (brokerage). As I explained earlier, 
the government designed the CFA process and wants all corn farmers to regularly use it.  
At this time, AgroEstacion’s appointed general manager was already aware of the 
practical and specific details of the CFA process. As he noted, you must first contact 
ASERCA, the federal government office that promotes agriculture. It then sends you a 
package that includes a list of farmers registered in the PROCAMPO census. “This type 
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of agreement is basically a partnership or association by contract in which you, the 
administrator, search for a buyer for the crop,” said the general manager. Both of the 
selected franchisees already had previous experiences managing CFA; they both found it 
to be a time-consuming activity. AgroEstacion could help the franchisees here, using 
technology and knowledge to speed up the process and grow the buyers’ spectrum by 
exploiting ANSA organizational resources. 
Table 17 Owners of process manuals 
Process Designer and owner 
• Purchasing process manual ANSA 
• IT counter process manual ANSA 
• Logistics process manual ANSA 
• Marketing (auditory) ANSA 
• Legal ANSA 
• Technological advice process ANSA 
• Training process ANSA 
• Brokerage AgroEstacion 
• Farming agreement contract process AgroEstacion 
• Farmers data base construction AgroEstacion 
• Tooling services AgroEstacion 
Beginning of initial training process for franchisees (downstream). The initial 
training of the franchisees began in March 2015 and concluded in April 2015. This 
training was conducted by three different suppliers: personnel from ANSA, personnel 
from AgroEstacion, and personnel from RAVE, a human resources’ outsourcing 
 112 
company and ANSA subsidiary—thereby exploiting the firm’s network resources as 
described in our model (Figure 7). Table 17 shows the courses and owners. 
At the end of March 2015, IT equipment was installed at the Indaparapeo 
AgroEstacion and a collaborator from ANSA’s IT department trained the personnel and 
franchise owner in how to use it. Another ANSA collaborator completed an eight-hour 
training course and then traveled to Indaparapeo to begin 42 hours of training for the 
franchisee and her staff in use of the administrative software. Next, ANSA’s subsidiary 
RAVE provided a six-hour training course in credit titles.  
The first two trainings (IT and administrative software) with the same trainers 
began in first week of April 2015 at the Ayotitlan franchise store. The training course 
provided by RAVE was put on hold; the AgroEstacion team taught this course in January 
2016.  
In August 2015, a member of AgroEstacion’s team taught a 21-hour review 
training course at the Michoacan franchisee. The same review training was offered at the 
Ayotitlan franchisee in February 2016. Tables 18 and 19 show a detailed description of 
the training plan for each franchisee.  
Both training experiences were different. According to AgroEstacion’s general 
manager, the first experience doing the training courses revealed some resistance from 
personnel at both local distributors, who said that these administrative processes would 
take too much time from them. However, according to comments made in a follow-up 
visit in December 2015, personnel from the Michoacan franchise have now changed their 
mind; as one staff member said: “Life is easier— we have everything in order, and the 
information is available and easy to find.” 
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Table 18 Training plan 2015 Indaparapeo franchisee 
Initial training plan 2015 
Training course Instructor 
Duration 
(hours) 
Date 
IT installation and use ANSA IT  8 March 23, 2015 
SAI-Inventory ANSA  16 March 24-25, 2015 
Credit process ANSA  8 March 26, 2015 
Invoicing process ANSA  8 March 26, 2015 
Customer base and payment application ANSA  8 March 27, 2015 
Effective collection process ANSA  2 March 28, 2015 
Credit titles training course RAVE  6 Pending 
Review training course AgroEstacion  21 August 9, 2015 
Table 19 Training plan 2015 Ayotitlan franchisee 
Initial training plan 2015 
Training course Instructor 
Duration 
(hours) 
Date 
IT installation and use ANSA IT  8  March 30, 2015 
SAI-Inventory ANSA  16  March 31–April 1, 2015 
Credit process ANSA  8  April 6, 2015 
Invoicing process ANSA  4  April 7, 2015 
Customer base and payment 
application ANSA  4  April 7, 2015 
Effective collection process ANSA  2  April 7, 2015 
Credit titles training course RAVE  6  Pending 
Review training course AgroEstacion  21  Pending 
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Sign bailment contract (equipment) and handle legal issues (registration, 
contracts, and trademarks). At the beginning of summer, the AgroEstacion team 
approved the preliminary bailment contracts (for equipment) to be signed by the 
franchisees. As mentioned previously, ANSA was one of the signing parties, as, at that 
time, AgroEstacion did not have legal status. A week later, the bailment contracts were 
signed. In a sign of trust between the local distributors and ANSA, equipment—
computers and, in the Indaparapeo case, a truck—had already been delivered early in 
March 2015. 
On November 30, 2015, the law firm informed ANSA via email that the 
AgroEstacion trademark titles it had applied for in May 2015 had been accepted by the 
authorities and were ready to use. 
Build the model store in Tlajomulco town. The AgroEstacion team and 
ANSA’s TMT decided to postpone construction of this store, aiming instead to direct 
financial resources toward more urgent matters. Among these matters was the need to 
acquire products—such as fertilizer and some seeds—that were not regularly in ANSA’s 
pipeline and that, given their nature, had to be paid for in cash. The model store’s 
construction was thus postponed to September 2016. 
Summary. In this stage, ANSA—through the actions of its TMT and managers—
reconfigured the structure and processes to be adapted to the realized option. This stage 
was primarily constituted by action and change. Most of the decisions were put in 
motion, and the firm adapted its structure to harmonize with the new strategy. Table 20 
summarizes the results.  
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Table 20 Summary of Crafting AgroEstacion 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Proactive management 
team (organizational) 
• Adaptive business 
model  (organizational) 
• Supply capability 
(organizational) 
• Outsourcing services 
and management 
(organizational) 
• Exportable operational 
manuals 
(organizational) 
• Reaffirm 
initial 
knowledge 
about the 
BOP network 
from the first 
four phases 
• Farming 
agreement 
contracts 
experience 
(knowledge) 
• Partnership Business 
Agreement 
• AgroEstacion as an 
administration 
platform 
• Two local distributors 
selected as franchisees 
• AgroEstacion income 
plan 
• Business model 
• Task force 
reconfigured  
• Freedom to leave or 
maintain the 
partnership 
• Fast, low-cost 
business process 
• Financial benefits in 
cost and in terms 
• Wider possibilities 
of serving more 
farmers with the 
farming agreement 
contract 
VII.6 Strategizing Process Options 
Design the commercial and cross-learning processes (for the firm and 
franchisees). One of the enabling processes that the strategy will create is the cross-
learning process between the firm and its franchisees and between the franchisees. 
Selection of the first franchisees was based on an analysis of their network and 
ownership of diverse knowledge in the brokerage process (knowledge resource), which 
served two different types of BOP corn farmer (organizational knowledge). Table 21 
shows the difference in the markets of the first two franchisees. 
The AgroEstacion team selected the franchisees primarily because of their 
network resources, but also because their locations did not create a conflict between 
them, allowing them to grow into more stores if there was potential to do so. This 
distance also gave them the security to share their knowledge—not only with 
AgroEstacion as a platform, but also with each other as allies. The AgroEstacion team 
designed three cross-learning forums to be held at three key times: one in March, before 
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the beginning of the crop season; one in June, which was the middle of the Spring-
Summer crop season; and one in December, during the harvest season. The first cross-
learning forum took place on December 11, 2015, and was called the Growth Forum. 
Illustration 4 displays the e-invitation to the first forum.  
Table 21 Market differences between franchisees 
Differences in market structure between franchisees 
Ayotitlan, Jalisco Indaparapeo, Michoacan 
• 350 farmers attended 
• Average land owned: 3 to 5 hectares 
• Possibility of market growth: 700 farmers 
• Type of corn: Yellow corn 
• Type of buyers: oil producers, food 
producers, livestock breeding companies, 
eggs producers, and milk companies 
• Type of organizational structure: familial 
• Farmers require farming services 
• 25 farmers attended 
• Average land owned: 15 to 20 hectares 
• Possibility of market growth: 100 farmers 
• Type of corn: White corn 
• Type of buyer: Millers 
• Type of organizational structure: semi- 
familial 
• Farmers do not require farming services 
Conduct follow-up workshop with the research and AgroEstacion teams. In 
the fall 2015, I conducted a follow-up workshop at GSU in Atlanta with the 
AgroEstacion team to validate the outcomes and review recent events. Three members of 
the management team traveled to Atlanta; the goal was to have this workshop in a relaxed 
atmosphere and to engage the project between the academic and practitioner worlds.  The 
participants in this follow-up were AgroEstacion’s general manager, AgroEstacion’s 
accountant, and ANSA’s manager in charge of project development. The objectives were 
to follow-up on the team’s most recent outcomes, hear about challenges it had faced, 
design together the next steps, and attend a presentation by a doctoral student who had 
been doing a case study on a project in Bangladesh that was similar to AgroEstacion.  
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The AgroEstacion team first gave a presentation on advances in the process of 
starting up the two franchisees stores. AgroEstacion team members reported that delivery 
of the two stores had to be delayed due to permits and other issues related to construction. 
The original target month to open both stores had been September 2015; at that follow-up 
workshop, the team announced that the opening date was now late October 2015. Then, 
AgroEstacion team discussed how the training plan was progressing and covered other 
details covered in the previous section of this dissertation. 
 
Illustration 4 e-invitation to the Growth forum 
AgroEstacion’s team reported that telecommunications as an issue, particularly 
with the Ayotitlan store. The general manager summed up the problems: “We faced a 
problem regard to the telecommunications in this store. It is located in a village with 
limited Internet access, the speed is extremely slow—no more than 1.5 MB—and the store 
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is also located in an area that faces bad mobile phone reception, so that wasn’t an option 
either. Finally, we decided to hire satellite Internet service. In Mexico, that is very 
expensive, but we are hoping that in the medium term, with the opening of another store, 
we will dilute this cost.  
As the presentation continued, our researchers learned that the AgroEstacion 
accountant was already taking control of the operative accounting and fiscal matters of 
both franchisees, exploiting the knowledge resource of the firm. What the accountant 
found was a mess in both businesses; order had to be implemented. At this point, the 
research team’s advisor intervened: “This is very important. Let’s recall that BOP not 
only means the lack of money, but also the lack of many other assets—like, in this case, 
education, knowledge, and skills. This is an example of co-creation of value.” 
The workshop advanced and other topics were presented. The AgroEstacion team 
informed us that it had applied for three different sources of funding, both private and 
public, but so far, ANSA was the only financial supplier for the project. Also, the team 
said that the initial investment for the overall project was projected as $500,000.00 USD 
for seven stores (including the two already chosen). This initial investment included: 
• Total transformation of the stores (aesthetics) 
• IT equipment and installation 
• Furniture 
• Initial inventory 
• One truck 
• Training  
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• Opening event 
AgroEstacion team members then talked about a small firm in Mexico City, 
owned by a Mexican-German woman who had heard about AgroEstacion through the 
Indaparapeo franchisee, who had bought fertilizer and seeds from her for many years. 
Her small company had 17 years’ experience in the industry and owned important 
resources in its network, including organizational and knowledge resources about the 
process of buying fertilizers from big companies and selling them to the BOP farmer 
network. It also owned knowledge about collecting white corn and selling it first to big 
and small millers for flour production, then to tortilla producers. This businesswoman 
was interest in the AgroEstacion strategy because it was aimed at the BOP corn farmer, a 
market she knew well. The AgroEstacion general manager had met with her three times 
in the previous month, and she had expressed interest in being a part of the project. We 
discussed with the AgroEstacion team various possibilities for engaging this small 
company with AgroEstacion and came up with three possible actionable options: 
• ANSA could hire her as a consultant for AgroEstacion and absorb her operation 
• She could become an AgroEstacion franchisee 
• The AgroEstacion general manager could get closer to her company and learn 
more details about the operation to have more data for making a decision; 
however, because it was a one-person operation, we concluded that the most 
important resource in her network was experience and knowledge. 
We all agreed that, before taking any steps, a better understanding of her business 
was needed. Once the AgroEstacion team finished its presentation, a former research 
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team member who had participated in the first action research stage presented the case 
study on which his own dissertation was grounded: a company similar to AgroEstacion, 
based in Bangladesh and developed by CARE. The AgroEstacion team listened with 
enthusiasm, as it presented an actual case that was already in motion with 70 stores. It 
also offered useful information; based on this case study, the AgroEstacion team decided 
to change its budget for the stores and aim for a less expensive look. 
Summary. Phase six represented the implementation of the project—that is, the 
action in our action research. In this phase, two local distributors were formally selected 
based on their BOP networks and their physical, knowledge, and organizational 
resources, as well as because their market and context differences will enrich the project. 
A date was set to start the cross-learning forum to co-create value.  By this time, the 
project was moving forward. AgroEstacion teams took over accounting responsibility 
from the franchisees and a “cleaning” process began to put the fiscal issues in order. 
Table 22 summarizes these results. 
Table 22 Summary of Strategizing Process Options 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Convening power 
(organizational)  
• Training capability 
(organizational and 
knowledge) 
• Accounting 
administration 
(organizational and 
knowledge) 
• Network of 
farmers 
(organizational) 
• Brokerage 
experience 
(knowledge) 
• Selection of two 
franchisees 
• Growth forum 
• Training process 
• Accounting 
control 
implemented 
• Third franchisee 
candidate 
• Cross-knowledge 
process 
• Knowledge 
sharing across a 
wide spectrum 
• Smaller learning 
curve 
• Controlled and 
organized growth 
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VII.7 Engaging Franchisees 
Between October and December 2015, the AgroEstacion project became a reality. 
The corn harvest was near and a good rainy season forecasted a good year for farmers in 
the states of Jalisco and Michoacan in 2015. The new franchisees were excited; despite 
much work to be done in the stores, everybody was confident that 2015 would be a good 
year. 
Then, on October 23, Hurricane Patricia struck Mexico. Patricia was considered 
one of the biggest and more devastating hurricanes in the country’s history; Illustrations 5 
and 6 show the size of this meteor.  
Patricia struck the coast at 17:40 Pacific Time and moved through the center of 
Jalisco state. Fortunately, the phenomenon hit the “Sierra Madre oriental”—that is, the 
West Mountains—and lost strength there. But winds and rain did their part in devastating 
the crop fields. One of the areas affected by Patricia was where the first AgroEstacion 
store was almost ready to open: the village of Ayotitlan. Winds overthrew cornfields that 
were almost ready for harvest.  Illustrations 7 and 8 show images from cornfields from 
farmers in the area’s AgroEstacion network. 
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Illustration 5 Hurricane Patricia hitting the Mexican coast 
 
Illustration 6 Hurricane Patricia (left) compared to Hurricane Katrina (right) 
One of AgroEstacion’s first acts was to implement a plan to help the franchisee in 
the affected area. This franchisee and her BOP network of farmers had signed the CFA, 
and they were obligated to deliver a contracted amount of corn grain to a specific 
buyer—otherwise, they could be fined and face problems when it came time to sign a 
contract the following year. Using ANSA’s organizational network, AgroEstacion 
contacted farmers in regions not affected by the hurricane who did not have a buyer for 
their corn. It then made agreements with these farmers to supply their corn to the 
franchisee, and thereby let it fulfill the contracted commitment.  
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Illustration 7 Cornfields affected by Patricia 2015 
 
Illustration 8 Cornfields affected by Patricia 2015 
Launch first two franchises stores. On November 12, 2105, the first 
AgroEstacion store opened in a ceremony to which farmers, suppliers, and ANSA 
personnel were invited. Illustration 9 shows the e-invitation for that particular day. 
AgroEstacion invited 120 farmers to the event; it also invited the Michoacan franchisee 
to initiate contact between the two franchisees prior to the first Growth Forum. The event 
started at noon and almost all the invited farmers were in attendance. Most were senior 
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farmers and their average age was around 50. They arrived with their wives, and some 
brought their whole family. During the event, the franchisee of the store gave a 
presentation, then gave the microphone to the ANSA CBO, who spoke briefly before 
introducing ANSA’s CEO, who explained the new company’s objective. 
 
Illustration 9 AgroEstacion opening day invitation 
In her opening speech to the farmers, the franchisee said: “I’m grateful to have 
you all at this event now that we are an AgroEstacion store, in partnership with ANSA—a 
new adventure that will help us to provide you with better products and services.” In the 
follow-up interview, she added: “I wasn’t nervous about the development of the whole 
project because ANSA was in charge of it all—I just agreed with what ANSA asked me.” 
The second franchisee from Michoacan also participated in a follow-up interview. “I 
think this is a dream come true, the store, the warehouse—this is a dream for the owner 
and also for me. When the ANSA’s regional manager told me about this, I saw this far 
away from our time—and at a certain time, I thought that the project would probably be 
forgotten.”  Illustrations 10, 11, and 12, show the inauguration day event.  
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Illustration 10 Inauguration day of the first AgroEstacion photo 1 
 
Illustration 11 Inauguration day of the first AgroEstacion photo 2 
By the end of November, the second franchise in Indaparapeo, Michoacan, was in 
operation, with all the store details and IT equipment delivered and installed. Due to the 
holidays and the proximity to the Growth Forum event in the second week of December, 
the AgroEstacion team and the franchisee decided to have the opening day event in 
January 2016.  Illustrations 13 and 14 show the second store in operation.  
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Illustration 12 Inauguration day of the first AgroEstacion photo 3 
Initiate the second training process for franchisees. The AgroEstacion team, in 
collaboration with ANSA’s administrative managers, designed the second training 
program for the AgroEstacion franchisees. The goal was to develop a managerial 
program to train the franchisees as managers, taking into consideration their lack of 
formal training.  
 
Illustration 13 Indaparapeo village’s AgroEstacion exterior view 
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The program was designed in collaboration with the follow managers: 
• ANSA’s CBO 
• AgroEstacion’s General Manager 
• ANSA’s human resources team 
• ANSA’s IT manager 
• ANSA’s internal auditor 
 
Illustration 14 Indaparapeo village’s AgroEstacion interior view 
In a meeting of the AgroEstacion and the TMT teams that took place during the 
second week of December 2015, AgroEstacion’s general manager presented the training 
process plan to the TMT, represented by the CBO. The training program was designed to 
cover the franchisees lack of managerial training, aiming to develop them into leaders—
not only in the market with their farmers, but also with their families and employees. The 
program was divided into three modules: 
• Business administration 
• Human resources management 
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• Agribusiness 
For this training program, AgroEstacion and ANSA exploited the resources in 
their own firm network, helping to develop the strategy and, through it, to inform the 
BOP network. The CCO and the President of ANSA were concern that improving these 
small businesses might be a double-edged sword: if the franchisees improved themselves 
sufficiently, they might at one point decide to leave and be, through this training process, 
well-prepared competitors. However, AgroEstacion and ANSA managers believed that 
this was a risk both firms should take. Table 23 shows the training program and time 
required.  
Table 23 Training process program for franchisees, 2016 
I. Business Administration Duration (hours) 
• Introduction to Microsoft Excel 
• Finances for non-financials 
• Operational accounting 
• Management of credit 
• Effective bill collection 
8 
8 
8 
4 
8 
II. Human resources management  Duration (hours) 
• Basic management of human resources 
• Teamwork 
• Assertive communication 
• Emotional intelligence 
• Coaching 
• Leadership 
8 
8 
6 
6 
4 
4 
III. Agribusiness Duration (hours) 
• BUMA (agrichemical container harvest) 
• Customer service 
• Production chains 
• Agrimarketing 
• Agribusiness 
4 
6 
5 
4 
5 
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Design the Growth Forum. One of the co-creating value activities that powered 
AgroEstacion strategy is the cross-knowledge process expected between the franchisees 
and the firm (which enables and triggers the process) and between the franchisees. The 
Growth Forum was conceived during a research team workshop in the summer of 2015. 
On the blackboard, my advisor sketched a list of activities that the firm could organize 
and strategize around to take advantage of the BOP network’s existing knowledge 
resources as well as those that will be created every crop season. As he noted: “This is 
valuable data, and we need to think how are we going to collect it as much as possible.”  
This process triggered a process called the Growth Forum. “Growth” is a word 
with powerful meaning in the farming context, given that crops, cattle, and poultry all 
must grow to bring success to the farmer. That name was also selected because it implies 
the growth of the franchisees as professionals—businessmen and businesswomen—and 
also as human beings. The first Growth Forum took place December 10–11, 2015, at 
ANSA headquarters, beginning with a day-long training by an external consultant in the 
contract farming process, and followed the next day by the Growth Forum itself. The 
event’s agenda included: 
• AgroEstacion presentation 
• Business Partnership Agreement signing 
• 2016 training plan presentation 
• Season 2015: Spring-summer experiences (cross-knowledge) 
On the first day, a government official from the Agriculture Department gave a 
lecture about contract farming and the CFA, and the benefits for farmers and franchisees. 
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Because franchisees, AgroEstacion, and ANSA personnel already knew about the 
subject, the department official was able to provide valuable pointers for enriching their 
existing knowledge.  Illustrations 15 and 16 show the first day of the Growth Forum.  
 
Illustration 15 Growth Forum day 1 photo 1 
The attendees were: 
• Franchisee #1 from Ayotitlan, with her daughter  
• Franchisee # 2 from Indaparapeo, with her husband and two employees 
• From AgroEstacion, the general manager, the accountant, and administrative 
support 
• From ANSA, the CEO, CBO, the regional manager and a sales rep from 
Michoacan state, the seed department manager, two seed sale reps, and the 
purchase manager 
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Illustration 16 Growth Forum day 1 photo2 
On the Growth Forum’s second day, ANSA’s CBO began by presenting 
AgroEstacion’s background, the crafting process, and the plans for 2016. Then, the 
general manager for AgroEstacion presented the social impact that AgroEstacion will 
create for BOP farmers through the CFA process. Tables 24 and 25 present the difference 
in financial productivity for farmers with and without AgroEstacion (the dollar rate at the 
time this table was created was 17.50 Mexican pesos per dollar). As the tables show, 
AgroEstacion’s multiply effect creates benefit for the BOP farmer and thus has social 
impact. This direct impact on farmer finances positively affects their context and 
improves their quality of life.  
During a break, I took the time to conduct a follow-up interview with both 
franchisees individually. The franchisee from Indaparapeo had positive remarks, as well 
as points about areas she thought needed improvement. She said that AgroEstacion 
should focus on improving the speed with which it answers the needs of franchisees: 
“The requirements from the farmers have a little space of time, and sometimes ANSA’s 
Business Unit in my area takes too much time to answer my requirements—sometimes 
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even more than two days.” Also, she said the subject of fertilizer needed more brainwork 
regarding how AgroEstacion manages the purchasing process and logistics for this 
essential product. “Fertilizer and seed are essential, no matter if you have the best 
agrichemicals, or the best technical advisors, if we don’t have these two products, we’ll 
lose our farmers.”  
Table 24 Financial benefit for the BOP yellow corn farmer 
Income and expenses Without AE With AE Difference 
Revenues from sales $160 $173.06  
Income for compensations $0 $23.30  
Income for productive induction $0 $20.00  
Total income per ton $160.00 $216.36 $56.36  
Average productivity per hectare 7 tons/ha 7 tons/ha  
Total income per hectare $1,120.00 $1,514,52 $394.52  
Technological package cost $1,097.08 $1,056.17  
Insurance $0 $38.34  
15% of coverage paid by the 
farmer $0 $12.19  
Brokerage cost $0 $20.00  
Total cost for farmer $1,097.08 $1,126.70 $29.62  
Profit per ton  $22.91 $387.83 $364.92  
Note: We considered a productivity of 7 tons per hectare in raining season, a cost per 
hectare of USD $2.20 per coverage for the farming agreement, and a brokerage cost of USD 
$2.85 per ton 
As for her positive comments, she said that being an AgroEstacion franchisee 
versus an ANSA distributor has made a great difference: “Now I have someone that 
listens to my demands, questions, or requirements, and give me a fast solution. It is like 
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having your own account executive, and that you are his only account.” She also had 
positive comments about the experience of having all the administrative processes 
working at her store. Now, she said, all the information is in order and easy to access.  
The forum continued, and at one point, the franchisee’s daughter from Ayotitlan 
asked a question that showed that extra effort was needed to make AgroEstacion’s full 
benefits understandable: “What do we win, as a family, for being in AgroEstacion?” The 
franchisee from Indaparapeo Michoacan intervened and answer this question: “In my 
previous work, before I became independent, the group of farmers with whom I worked 
were very messy with their accounting matters, so I leave this small firm and then they 
got audited by the government and they got fined by almost USD $571,000.00 for all the 
mess they had in their account information. So, AgroEstacion will help us to avoid this 
kind of problems and also there are other activities that AgroEstacion will do for us, like 
helping us to get better rates in our credits, etc.”  
Finally, the CBO presented the management training program presented in Table 
23 and explained the objective of the program’s structure. The franchisees expressed 
excitement about the program and thanked the team. At 14:00 Pacific Time, the Business 
Partnership Agreement was signed (see Illustrations 17 and 18). 
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Table 25 Financial benefit for the BOP white corn farmer 
Income and expenses Without AE With AE Difference 
Revenues from sales $160 $215.77  
Income for 
compensations $0.00 $23.30  
Income for productive 
induction $0.00 $0.00  
Total income per ton $160.00 $239.07 $79.07  
Average productivity per 
hectare 7 tons/ha 7 tons/ha  
Total income per hectare $1,120.00 $1,673,54 $553.54  
Technological package 
cost $1,196.85 $1,206.11  
Insurance $0.00 $38.34.00  
15% of coverage paid by 
the farmer $0.00 $12.19  
Brokerage cost $0.00 $20.00  
Total cost for farmer $1,196.85 $1,276.65 $79.79  
Profit or loss per ton –$76.85 $396.89 $473.75  
Note: We considered a productivity of 7 tons per hectare in raining season, a cost 
per hectare of USD $2.20 per coverage for the farming agreement, and a 
brokerage cost of USD $2.85 per ton 
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Illustration 17 Signing of business partnership agreement 1 
 
Illustration 18 Signing of business partership agreement 2 
Summary. At the highest level, this phase was all about bringing people together 
to share knowledge and experiences. The franchisees’ stores were already up and running 
before the PBA signing. The opening day of the first AgroEstacion store was a happy 
event, despite the damage done by Hurricane Patricia. The management training program 
for 2016 was designed in collaboration with ANSA’s personnel. The knowledge sharing 
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continued in the Growth Forum, which took place at ANSA’s headquarters; there, 
knowledge was exchanged between the firm and its two franchisees, and practical 
problems the franchisees were facing were resolved as a team. 
Table 26 Summary of Engaging Franchisees 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Emergency process to 
help franchisees 
fulfill grain delivery 
commitments 
(organizational) 
• Experience in 
training design 
(knowledge) 
• Planning experience 
(knowledge) 
• Contingency plan 
(knowledge) 
• Farmers’ network 
• Convening power 
of farmers’ network 
• Reaffirm initial 
knowledge about 
BOP network from 
the first four phases 
• Share supply 
capabilities 
• Compare results 
for farmers with 
an agreement and 
those without an 
agreement   
• Develop a 
management 
training program 
• Overstock of grain 
for one franchisee 
helps cover the 
lack of grain for 
the other  
 
VII.8 Networking for Expansion 
To be financially successful, AgroEstacion needed to expand its operation and 
enlarge its network. The TMT and the managers from both ANSA and AgroEstacion 
knew that. To be profitable, the project needed at least seven franchisees operating. This 
fact triggered the Networking for Expansion phase. 
Develop the Executive Advisory Board. In the same researcher workshop in 
which the Growth Forum was conceived, we also came up with the idea of creating an 
executive advisory board. The main objective was to invite influential people from 
diverse fields—business, academia, and government—to join the board and contribute 
new ideas and viewpoints, but more important, to contribute through their networks. The 
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members of this board will be selected based on their reputation, experience, and 
networking capability. Given AgroEstacion’s BOP orientation, the possibility of 
exploiting the networks of board members was extensive. The board would be presided 
over by the President of ANSA. Figure 12 shows the board’s planned structure as of fall 
2016. The TMT and AgroEstacion decided that the board’s creation should occur after 
the opening of at least five to seven AgroEstacion franchisees. 
Introduce the AgroEstacion business model to suppliers and governmental 
officials. Among the plans for 2016, AgroEstacion’s team and ANSA’s TMT intend to 
present the firm first to suppliers and then to governmental officials. Both teams agreed 
that AgroEstacion needed to be presented as a functioning entity, and no longer as a 
project.  
To accomplish this required at least six months in operation to present a tangible 
network on both sides of the model, along with some experiences to talk about. The TMT 
believed that some of the MNC suppliers might be interested in AgroEstacion’s 
development. In the follow-up with the TMT on September 28, 2015, the CCO shared 
exiting news: one of the MNC suppliers’ top managers called him to express his 
company’s interest in forming a partnership with ANSA to open 17 direct sales stores in 
different parts of Mexico; the purpose would be to shorten the commercial chain in 
specific crops, such as berries, vegetables, and sugar cane. The proposed partnership 
would be exclusively an investment through merchandise and capital with ANSA, and 
the MNC would have no legal ownership of the stores or interest in buying ANSA’s 
stocks. “They just want to push us to open these stores, giving $25,000.00 USD per store 
in cash and $25,000.00 USD in merchandises, with the unique condition that the stores 
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must be strongly oriented toward their brand and present publicity related to their 
company.”  
This kind of deal had no precedent in the history of ANSA and came to be seen as 
a risk due to the level of attention the TMT might focus on this distracting new project—
and away from AgroEstacion. Finally, however, the AgroEstacion team convinced the 
TMT members that both projects were different and complementary: the stores in 
partnership with the MNC supplier focus on crops other than the corn market and did not 
emphasize the BOP farmer market. This MNC will be one of the first to which the 
AgroEstacion team and ANSA’s TMT will present the new firm and the project for the 
next five years. ANSA’s TMT concurred that, to present this project to a supplier, it must 
be justified by the accessibility of the supplier’s product line, as well as its ability to be 
adapted to the BOP corn farmers market. 
During the firm’s Christmas party, the CCO from this MNC told ANSA’s CBO 
and CCO that his company wanted them to travel to Brazil, to their regional office, to 
meet with their Brazilian counterparts who are reaching the BOP market in a project that 
also does brokerage of crops. 
AgroEstacion managers and ANSA’s TMT agreed that March 2016 would be the 
right time to present the AgroEstacion project to at least three MNCs suppliers. This 
revived the preliminary option of a possible JV with an MNC, tailoring the JV to follow 
the Integrated Model of BOP Strategizing. Although we discarded this JV option in the 
first stage of the research, we realized it could be attractive to an MNC if the project were 
appropriately presented. One way to engage an MNC in the strategy might be to develop 
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the strategy in collaboration with an NGO such as CARE to mediate the operations, thus 
giving the MNC certainty as to the strategy’s social meaning.  
Scout candidates for the next two franchisees. In November 2015, 
AgroEstacion’s general manager began the process to choose, through ANSA’s 
distributors network, the next potentials franchisees to approach in 2016. In addition, in a 
follow-up interview in early December 2015, he expressed new ideas that emerged 
during his conversations with other ANSA distributors, one of which was strongly related 
to a preliminary option in Phase 2 of this project: “There are some distributors that heard 
about AgroEstacion, and they are interested in get in a partnership with us, but… I think 
that many of them do not qualify to be an AgroEstacion franchise.” Some of these 
distributors owned resources in their network, but they also had additional characteristics 
that disqualified them to be in a PBA with ANSA. One of the local distributors, for 
example, owned an important network of farmers (knowledge and organizational) and 
had many years of experience in the corn farming industry. However, the distributor was 
a partnership between three brothers who were having problems between them related to 
succession plans. In addition, they could not be considered as BOP because they owned 
large extensions of land and a big ranch (physical resources). Another local distributor 
who approached AgroEstacion’s general manager did not own a network of farmers and 
did not have experience in corn brokerage. However, this gave the general manager an 
idea: “AgroEstacion could have another service in its business model: we could offer to 
him (the local distributor) an outsourcing of managerial services, as if he were a 
franchisee. He had a lot of administrative and fiscal problems, he does not know how to 
manage his business, so I thought: Why can’t we offer him the management of his store, 
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and we can put a small sign that say: managed by AgroEstacion. We’ll provide the 
software and the training, but he will pay a monthly fee and, of course, he will do the 
investment in equipment and renovations.” 
 
Figure 12 Executive Advisory Board 
This idea, which was similar to one of the preliminary seized actionable options in 
Phase 2, was well perceived by the TMT, and they encouraged the general manager to 
explore it further. 
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In the last follow-up interview in mid December, the general manager expressed 
concerns about beginning the scouting process for new franchisees too soon. He 
expressed to me that, at this point, he saw great potential in the new firm, but the lack of 
financial resources available for fast use could compromise AgroEstacion’s strength: “I 
would like to have the certainty of the cash to buy the fertilizer and seeds for these two 
[existing] franchisees before thinking of recruiting new ones.” Supplying agrichemical 
and training had been a smooth process so far because ANSA owned these resources. 
However, in the case of fertilizer and seeds—specifically, the brand required by the 
farmer—cash was needed. “I prefer to be sure that I’ll be able to give all that we promise 
to the franchisees before opening new ones that will tighten our cash availability.”  
The outsourcing of managerial service seems to him to be the best next step for 
AgroEstacion; to achieve it, the firm would need to add an additional person at the end of 
March 2016. This person’s position would be for “implementation and operational 
tracing.” The AgroEstacion team discussed the option of offering this position to the 
woman who led the small Mexico City firm (described in Phase 7.6). Offering the 
outsourcing service to her small firm would be a first step in transforming her 
organization into a future franchisee; it would also let the team collect the needed data. 
Summary. During the development of this phase, changes began to occur. The 
development of the Executive Advisory Board was decided upon, and AgroEstacion and 
ANSA’s team decided that 2016 would be the year to build this board after achieving 
concrete results with the first two franchisees. Scouting and selecting new franchisees 
were put on hold until enough capital could be accumulated to fulfill the needs of existing 
franchisees. Instead, a new service—outsourcing managerial processes—will be added to 
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AgroEstacion. In addition to creating value, this service might help AgroEstacion identify 
potential franchisee candidates. Some of ANSA’s local distributors expressed interest in 
this service. A possible management-outsourcing client for AgroEstacion was also 
discussed: the small firm run by the woman in Mexico City, who is also a possible third 
franchisee. Table 27 summarizes the results in this phase.   
Table 27 Summary of Networking for Expansion 
Firm network BOP network Options Value co-creation 
• Convening power of 
relevant characters 
from diverse settings 
and backgrounds 
• Possible exploitation 
and 
commercialization of 
management 
capability 
• Interested local 
distributors 
with potential 
to contract 
outsourcing 
service 
• Design of the 
outsourcing 
managerial processes 
to offer as part of the 
business model 
• Executive advisory 
board put on hold 
• Possible outsourcing 
client found in third 
potential franchisee  
• Improve the 
performance of 
additional 
distributors  
• Create value between 
ANSA and 
additional local 
distributors 
(microbusiness) 
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VIII CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION 
In this dissertation, I have presented my action research study with ANSA, a firm 
in which I am fully embedded, both professionally and personally. My objective was to 
help ANSA find a clear way to attack the challenges it currently faces—challenges that 
are creating problems in the industry, in the market, and within the organization itself, 
and that could, in the future, put ANSA’s leadership position and possibly its very 
survival at risk. 
This dissertation applied an Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing (Cazares et 
al., 2015) created during the first stage of the action research in collaboration with a team 
of researchers and my advisor. The model combines DCT and ODS to help firms 
strategize value co-creation with BOP farmers. During the action research, I applied the 
model to help ANSA develop and begin implementing AgroEstacion, a franchise-based 
new business targeting the BOP corn farmer segment in Mexico. Overall, I have 
presented a detailed account of how this new entity developed as an embedded answer to 
the research question: How can an agribusiness company strategize and implement the 
co-creation of value with BOP corn farmers in Mexico? In the following, I present my 
contributions to addressing ANSA’s problematic situation, to the area of concern, to co-
creating value with the BOP farmers, and to the theoretical framework itself (Table 1). 
VIII.1 Contributions to Problem Setting 
In the context of an organization, diverse options arise from its dynamic 
capabilities. However, if the organization’s management ignores those capabilities and 
lacks a clear understanding of its resources and how they are constituted, those options 
will go unnoticed.  
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ANSA had faced many challenges throughout its history. It had confronted and 
successfully overcome them by using its dynamic capabilities in a pragmatic way, by 
finding serendipitous outcomes that have improved the firm’s position in both the market 
and the industry, and by selecting the actionable options almost by instinct. As a mature 
firm, ANSA must now change the way the executives envision the future and face its 
current challenges. Experience and knowledge are valuable resources that must be used 
in a formal way (David J. Teece et al., 1997). ANSA understood that its business model 
could be challenged in the near future as suggested by its distributors, industry experts, 
and suppliers. They also came to understand that the BOP strategic mindset offers great 
opportunities to help address this problematic situation.  
By exploring and exploiting the dynamic capabilities of ANSA and its local 
distributors, this dissertation helped the firm design a new business model for penetrating 
additional markets in the BOP corn farmers’ segment with the purpose of co-creating 
value with the distributors and the BOP farmers (Table 1). As a result, ANSA used the 
three elements of the Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing (Figure 7) to help address its 
problematic situation: 
1. Designing and creating a franchise business platform. ANSA understood the 
need to develop a strategy downstream—that is, a strategy that would get the firm 
closer to the farmers. Also, ANSA knew the size and potential of the BOP corn 
farmer’s market in Mexico, and the huge possibilities to co-create value in it. The 
Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing helped the managers identify the resources 
in the firm network and the BOP network (the local distributors) and subsequently 
sense the available options, seize the actionable options, and select a realizable 
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one that could help reconfigure resources to co-create value. This resulted in the 
new franchise-based firm AgroEstacion, which complements ANSA’s existing 
business model. As such, it promises to penetrate additional markets with 
improved capabilities and without risking the firm’s stability and control or 
limiting the freedom of its local distributors. 
2. Exploring and exploiting the capabilities of the BOP local distributors. Observing 
that “both, exploration and exploitation are associated with learning and 
innovation, albeit of different types” (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006), ANSA 
learned to identify its own dynamic capabilities and use them to develop its firm 
network, as well as to explore the local distributors to better understand the BOP 
network and its resources. Creating the new business platform represents the 
innovation part, which promises to improve the performance of the BOP local 
distributors and thereby benefit both ANSA and BOP farmers. The new firm 
AgroEstacion will, in this way, exploit the capabilities and resources of both the 
upstream and downstream networks to strengthen the position of both in the 
market. 
3. Metrics to judge the success of the strategy. ANSA’s TMT needs to measure the 
performance of AgroEstacion at two primarily points: the BOP corn farmers and 
the BOP local distributors. To measure the benefits created for the farmers, I 
presented Table 24 and 25 to help capture the financial benefit for BOP corn 
farmers of both types of corn: yellow and white. Further, as Table 28 shows, the 
franchisee, the technical advisor, and the marketing manager will record the main 
figures in the farmer cropping process—from the initial budget of raw materials 
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(seeds, fertilizers, agrichemicals, and mechanical works) to the price of the corn at 
the selling point to any additional costs—to calculate the profit earned by the 
farmer. To measure the benefit created for the BOP local distributors, 
AgroEstacion will supervise the accounting process of each franchisee, including 
sales, costs, and expenses, to establish the financial balance of each store. Finally, 
the management team of AgroEstacion developed a financial statement plan for 
the seven years (see Table 29).  
4. Co-creating value. ANSA and the BOP local distributors will seek to improve 
their performance and strengthen their position in the market through continuous 
strategizing of AgroEstacion as a business platform. ANSA will seek to expand its 
participation directly with the BOP farmers. The goal is to increase its market 
penetration and influence by completing the commercial cycle as described in 
Figure 2 and by learning from the BOP local distributors how to execute and 
improve the brokerage process of corn. Once this process has been established, 
ANSA will continue to improve the products and services to the BOP farmers. 
Hence, the BOP local distributors will own a better, more organized, and more 
profitable store, and the farmers will improve their corn production, hopefully 
moving them out of the BOP segment through a process facilitated by 
AgroEstacion.  
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Table 28 Farmers benefit metrics table 
Farmers benefit metrics 
Farmer’s name: Type of corn: Year 1 Year 2 Year t 
• Area planted (# Ha)    
• Farming agreement process (% * Ha)    
• Soil preparation (Fixed cost)    
• Soil analysis (Fixed cost)    
• Pre-seeding herbicide (Variable depending in weed presence)    
• Seed cost (Price of 1.5 seed per bag) * (# Ha) 1 bag per Ha) + seed 
treatment     
• Fertilizer cost 1st & 2nd applications (Price of fertilizer mix)*(# Ha)    
• Seeding (Fixed cost)    
• Agrichemicals regular application (Technological package)    
• Agrichemical unforeseen problems (Variable cost, undetermined)    
• Cropping process (Fee * Ha)    
• Corn produced (Ton * Ha) “Performance per Ha”     
• Brokerage process (Fee * Ton)    
• Total cost per hectare (∑ costs per Ha)    
• Total income for the farmer (Price of ton * ∑ tons produced)    
• Productivity (Sale – Costs)    
 (1) Waste is considered broken grains and plants that got stuck in the cropper machine 
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Table 29 Farmers benefit metrics table 
Projected income statements for the franchisee’s store USD 
 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
Income  653,443   784,131   823,338   864,505   907,730   953,116  1,000,772  
Cost  519,771   623,726   654,912   687,658   722,040   758,143   796,050  
Gross profit  133,671   160,405   168,426   176,847   185,689   194,974   204,723  
Operating 
costs  54,317   60,648   63,385   66,248   69,242   72,373   75,647  
Finance costs  24,481   29,377   30,846   32,389   34,008   35,709   37,494  
Operational 
profit  54,873   70,380   74,194   78,210   82,439   86,893   91,582  
Net profit  38,411   49,266   51,936   54,747   57,707   60,825   64,107  
IRS  16,462   21,114   22,258   23,463   24,732   26,068   27,475  
Employee 
profit sharing  3,841   4,927   5,194   5,475   5,771   6,082   6,411  
AgroEstacion 
fee  25,989   31,186   32,746   34,383   36,102   37,907   39,802  
Franchisee’s 
earnings  38,411   49,266   51,936   54,747   57,707   60,825   64,107  
VIII.2 Contribution to the Area of Concern 
Current literature does not focus on how firms can strategize and implement 
options to target the BOP market. As Prahalad has suggested (Prahalad, 2010), 
considerable effort has been invested in targeting the BOP market as consumers, but few 
efforts discuss how, specifically, firms can partner with the BOP (Perez-Aleman & 
Sandilands, 2008). Some literature could be considered as offering an exposition of firm 
strategies for BOP engagement, such as the role played by NGOs and MNCs in emerging 
markets to create a network of suppliers of raw material, involving companies like Coca-
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Cola or Starbucks (Sheth, 2011). In contrast, this dissertation presents detailed empirical 
insights into the process through which a single firm strategized the BOP market and 
created alliances with its BOP local distributors, transforming them into partners, 
improving their organizations, and developing a distribution chain to bring resources to 
the BOP in a better and faster way, thereby improving their lives—and, as a result, co-
creating value across all stakeholder groups. As described above, this strategy includes a 
firm network (ANSA) and a BOP network (the BOP local distributors) who also engage 
the BOP farmers.  
ANSA took steps to improve the business and operative quality of its BOP local 
distributors; this involved the risk that those local distributors, once their operation 
improved, could detach from the firm to become competitors instead of an allies. 
Improving the BOP local distributors’ operation and transforming them into franchisees 
of a brand promises to increase ANSA’s commercial operation as BOP local distributors 
increase the amount of products and services delivered to the market. In this process, 
ANSA will develop a new network of farmers, formerly under the control of the BOP 
local distributor; it will thereby create knowledge and improve its organization by 
leveraging its resources. The BOP local distributors will strengthen their own 
organizations, developing a more solid company through a more professional business 
process. Observing that “business process management therefore requires information to 
be accessed and shared across organizational and geographical boundaries” (Davenport, 
1993; Sandberg et al., 2014), the BOP local distributors will not only supply better 
products and services to the BOP farmers, but become the conveyor of knowledge and 
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technology that will improve the production of the BOP farmer and ensure appropriate 
commercialization of their crops. 
As such, this dissertation has helped open the black box of how individual firms 
might embrace the emerging BOP market through systematic strategizing. The reported 
strategizing was supported by theoretical insights from DCT, ODS, and the growing BOP 
literature. 
VIII.3 Contributions to the Theoretical Framework 
The Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing (Figure 7) provided a practical tool to 
help ANSA managers develop their strategies. Other managers can adapt the model for 
diverse contexts, in essence creating their own roadmap for entering BOP markets and 
environments. At its core, the Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing allows managers to 
use DCT to explore and exploit how specific resources of both its firm and BOP 
networks can be translated into a viable strategy by using ODS to sense available options 
and seize the actionable ones, and finally reconfiguring resources to realize select 
options. Hence, this dissertation contributes to BOP literature by combining two theories 
into an integrated model that firms can use to strategize BOP options; it also 
demonstrates the practical value of the model through a detailed real-world case. 
Drawing on the theoretical literature and the empirical findings from ANSA, I suggest a 
number of propositions related to the Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing. 
 Proposition 1: Our Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing has applicability and 
adaptability for other contexts and industries when the objective of a firm is to engage in 
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the BOP markets with little previous knowledge or experience and to draw on its existing 
downstream networks.  
This proposition suggests that any type of business with no direct access to the 
BOP market can embrace, exploit, and develop its upstream and downstream networks to 
include the BOP segment successfully into its market (Tashman & Marano, 2009). 
Although the model was developed in an action research in the agribusiness context in 
the Mexican market, it has potential applicability in other situations. BOP markets are 
numerous and scattered, and their similarities in different economies are considerable. 
Still, commercial and geographical accessibility is challenging, even for MNCs entering 
into those markets, particularly if they have no previous experience. As such, the 
Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing will likely work best for medium-sized companies 
with limited financial resources and with some established BOP network activity that will 
give them a starting point to co-create value. 
Proposition 2: The process of iteratively sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring 
options links DCT and ODS into a practical managerial approach that can help a firm 
develop a successful strategy to venture into the BOP market.  
A long as a firm identifies its dynamic capabilities to recognize and classify its 
resources, this process offers a careful and detailed decision-making and strategizing tool. 
During this process, the sensing phase supplies a list of new opportunities that become 
available options (David J Teece, 2007), as in the action research’s first stage in phase 2 
of the problem-solving cycle, when multiple options emerged from the data collection 
process. However, these sensed available options needed to be improved and 
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systematically examined in terms of desirability and feasibility (Sandberg et al., 2014) in 
order to suit the firm’s reality and capacity. Only then could they be transformed into 
actionable options. As an example, one of ANSA’s initial available options sensed was 
the possibility of a JV with an MNC, with the objective of strengthening ANSA’s market 
position and using the MNC’s resources to access the BOP. It was an upstream option, 
and one that was not in the firm’s control.  Because of this, one side of the Integrated 
Model for BOP Strategizing was blurring and unclear, and the process of informing and 
developing was incomplete. Using ODS lets firms combine the seized actionable options 
and structure them into a realizable one through a process of analysis between researchers 
and practitioners. This was the case at ANSA, and it was through this triggered 
reconfiguration process that the new firm, AgroEstacion, was designed. As this case 
shows, both theories, DCT and ODS, shorten the space and time required to develop a 
strategy. 
Proposition 3: The business model that results from applying the Integrated 
Model for BOP Strategizing can increase the likelihood of successful co-creation of value 
with the BOP market.  
As explained by Prahalad, (Prahalad & Ramaswamy, 2004): “Co-creation is 
about joint creation of value by the company and the customer. It is not the firm trying to 
please the customer” (p. 8). The Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing is fundamentally 
a strategy created by the iterative combination of DCT and ODS and the unfolding of 
resources from two networks to realize an option. This option enables the creation of 
value for both networks and the stakeholders in a dynamic model of business-to-business-
to-consumer (B2B2C). The strategy allows a series of benefits for the BOP market. In my 
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summaries at the end of each phase of the problem-solving cycle, column 4 in each table 
displays what I consider to be the value co-creation outcomes developed in each phase. 
BOP markets are sensitive and people in them tend to be loyal when firms treat them as 
producers rather than simply consumers (Karnani, 2007). The perception in the BOP 
market is that, when a firm engages with them, it means that the firm trusts them, so they 
trust the firm. In my research, the local BOP distributors had a positive perception of the 
business model. They felt a positive change in the way the firm viewed them. One of the 
female entrepreneurs interviewed after being selected as a franchisee said the following: 
“Everybody knows ANSA has not the cheaper price in the products, but the way it treats 
us, the clients, makes the difference.” The business model that emerged from the 
Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing gives and receives, developing a process of 
mutual growth /or both the firm and the BOP. When other firms choose to follow the 
Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing, they must keep in mind that the base is value co-
creation, which both enables and triggers the strategy. Value co-creation is also a 
perception sustained on evidence. Both networks perceive that they are creating value for 
themselves and for the other.  
Proposition 4: Firms will more likely be successful in engaging with the BOP if 
they combine upstream and downstream resources into new value co-creation 
capabilities. 
As Helen Keller famously noted: “Alone we can do so little; together we can do 
so much.” BOP markets are scattered and numerous; the possibilities to succeed in them 
are higher when we join forces with additional stakeholders. Various barriers also exist: 
corruption, illiteracy, inadequate infrastructure, currency fluctuations, and bureaucratic 
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red tape that make doing business profitably a challenge in this segment of the market 
(Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). No matter how unique a firm’s dynamic capabilities are, 
combining the resources of different networks helps ensure a successful strategy. Using 
networks gives the strategy a solid structure, as long as the resources owned by these 
networks are identified and classified as useful to the development of options. During the 
development of my dissertation and the business model of AgroEstacion, an MNC 
approached ANSA with a concept similar to the Integrated Model of BOP Strategizing. 
Without knowing of the model’s existence, they expressed to ANSA the desire to create a 
soft partnership with the firm, aimed at getting directly to the BOP market. When 
presented its proposal, the MNC’s representative named both the MNC’s resources and 
those owned by ANSA, suggesting that the alliance was a good way to get directly to the 
farmer of specific crops. The MNC was looking to co-create value with ANSA. The 
Integrate Model of BOP Strategizing and the crafting of AgroEstacion were applicable in 
this particular case, to solve this particular problem. However, they almost certainly can 
be reconfigured, improved, and adapted to other situations. Further research should be 
done to perfect the model and the strategy for wider applications.  
Proposition 5: A firm can accelerate its engagement with the BOP market by 
leveraging NGOs as mediators to establish joint ventures upstream with major suppliers 
and other investors. 
The presence of a well-known NGO gives any social project developed by a 
private firm the social strength needed to be recognizable. An NGO should be an active 
consideration in the strategy; the operational enrollment of a NGO is an important 
element that could give muscle to the strategy in the eyes of the stakeholders and the 
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public. In his 2007 article, “The Miracle of Marketing to the Base of the Pyramid: How 
the Private Sector Can Help Alleviate Poverty,” Aneel Karnani wrote the following: “An 
important element of the BOP proposition is that the MNCs should take the lead role in 
the BOP initiative to sell to the poor. In fact, to the extent that there are opportunities to 
sell to the poor it is usually small to medium-size local enterprises that are best suited to 
exploiting these opportunities.” (p. 96) ANSA’s TMT, the AgroEstacion managers, and I 
consider AgroEstacion a co-creating value strategy that could maximize its performance 
by enrolling an MNC in the strategy. The presence of an NGO such as CARE could 
provide a needed social profile to make the strategy more attractive to an MNC This type 
of relationship between NGOs and MNCs is not new; as Paola Perez-Aleman and Marion 
Sandilands noted in 2008, the relation between NGOs and MNCs can mitigate the 
barriers of entry for small or BOP farmers or businesses in the global market (Perez-
Aleman & Sandilands, 2008). Having an NGO such as CARE involved in an 
intermediary role in the AgroEstacion strategy could create higher interest among MNCs, 
including ANSA’s existing suppliers. 
VIII.4 Concluding remarks 
In this action research, I was a member of the TMT of the organization where the 
research was conducted, and I was the principal responsible for the design and 
development of AgroEstacion, the new business entity. This position was useful for data 
collection and gave me access to secondary data useful for developing a mental map of 
the project. However, as an insider researcher (Coghlan & Brannick, 2005), one faces 
risky moments of influence and biases throughout the entire process. My position as not 
only the CBO, but also the firstborn of ANSA’s founder put pressure on the development 
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and timing of the research and the construction of the strategy. I was literally running two 
marathons, advancing and following the structure of the research process while fulfilling 
the dates to deliver on practical problem solving. I took great care to follow principles for 
rigorous and ethical research, keeping in mind my position in the firm and leveraging the 
collaboration with my advisor and co-researchers. Also, I limited the number of biases by 
carefully triangulating between multiple data sources and by continuously managing my 
commitment to both the firm and the doctoral program.  
Overall, it is important to emphasize the limitations that result from this being a 
single case study and from adopting DCT and ODS as the key theoretical inspirations. In 
addition, I will mention the following research conditions that have practical implications 
for how the results might be leveraged in other contexts: 
1. Ensuring management support. The project to strategize BOP options at ANSA 
had strong management support and ownership. Complex organizations with 
strong internal barriers can slow the strategizing process in multiple ways. Also, if 
the project does not have freedom to experiment and the authority to make 
changes, the strategy can easily get stuck. 
2. Focusing the business. Initially, AgroEstacion is focusing on the market of grains, 
specifically corn. Corn can, with the right precautions, be stored and kept for long 
periods of time and sold on different markets in Mexico. However, we also 
interviewed farmers from the Pacific coast that cultivated fruits and vegetables—
crops that need special types of storage, have short shelf lives, and typically target 
US markets. In addition, we interviewed local distributors serving BOP farmers 
who cultivate corn for self-consumption by their cattle. These farmers were dairy 
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producers, and their problem was to produce and sell milk. It is probable that after 
perfecting the business model of AgroEstacion, the firm can start to venture into 
those types of markets. For each particular firm, multiple options will exist for 
engaging in BOP markets. An important decision is how best to prioritize and 
sequence these options. 
3. Leveraging dynamic capabilities. The Integrated Model for BOP Strategizing can 
be used in different firms as discussed above, but the strategizing depends 
strongly on the presence of requisite dynamic capabilities and resources 
(Constance E. Helfat & Margaret A. Peteraf, 2003). Without the presence of these 
dynamic capabilities and resources to create leadership in the industry and the 
market, the model is unlikely to lead to a successful strategy. 
4. Appreciating the political context. Unlike the coffee growers in Mexico that have 
the support and supervision of an NGO in the agreement between them and the 
Starbucks company (Sheth, 2011), developing support for the BOP corn farmers 
requires considerable effort. Only Monsanto is actually doing some work with 
BOP orientation (Glover, 2007), but its efforts are frequently blocked by NGOs 
that are fighting against the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs), 
specifically the use of improved corn seeds. Corn crops in Mexico have become a 
political bounty since the release of the GMO corn seed at the end of the 20th 
century. In addition, in the Mexican farming context, there are more foundations 
than NGOs. For example, the Fundación Mexicana para el desarrollo rural 
(Mexican Foundation for Rural Development) locates a farming community, 
organizes a group of farmers with the same profile, and trains these farmers based 
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on provision of a technological package. Obviously, it is important for any BOP 
strategy to consider such options for support and create the requisite alliances for 
realizing them.    
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